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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
factors affecting the repatriation of Afghan refugees 
living in Pakistan, by using data collected in these refugee 
camps, during the Fall of 1988. 
Refugees are generally defined as those people fleeing 
their country out of fear of persecution or physical injury 
from forces within their country. The flight into or out of 
a country, by refugees, can be seen as a special type of 
migration or population flow. 
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The initial model of population flows was developed by 
Ravenstein (1885). Migrations and decisions to migrate were 
measured along a simple linear continuum of pluses and 
minuses. If more pluses then minuses were present, movement 
(migration) occurred. This model was applied only to 
migration and never applied directly to refugee flight or 
refugee repatriation. 
Ravenstein's model of migration has since been 
elaborated into a model of "pushes" and "pulls" (Lee 1966). 
Donald Bogue's work, Principles of Demography, (1969), 
identifies such "push" factors as decline in national 
resources, loss of employment, oppressive treatment of 
political, ethnic, and religious minorities. Catastrophes 
such as fire, flood and drought are also considered "push" 
factors. 
A more complete model, and the first one applicable to 
refugees' flows, is the Process Model of Egon F. Kunz 
(1981). Kunz identifies two types of factors; a home 
related dimension and a host related dimension. Kunz, 
however, only discusses the flow from the home country to 
the host country and does not apply his model to 
repatriation. 
Data for this thesis was collected through one hundred 
interviews, conducted in Pakistan, during the Fall of 1988. 
These interviews provided information regarding the 
background of the refugees, their previous condition in 
Afghanistan and their new lives in Pakistan. 
When the refugees were asked why they originally left 
Afghanistan, 28 percent answered simply, "Because of the 
Russians." Twenty-one percent replied, "Because of 
communism and its opposition to Islam." Twenty percent 
said, "Because of invasion and the war" and 24 percent 
answered, "Because of the fighting and the attacks." Only 
four percent of the refugees claimed to have left because 
they had either been put in jail or were threatened with 
being jailed. 
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In trying to determine certain factors that could 
either block or encourage repatriation, the refugees were 
asked a series of questions about whether they thought they 
would return under certain situations. The first of these 
questions was, "Will you return before the Russians leave 
Afghanistan?" An overwhelmingly 99 percent said they would 
not. When asked if the refugees would return if the parties 
or Mujahideen were fighting for power among themselves, 60 
percent answered, "No" and 20 percent answered, "Yes, they 
would go back to try and stop the fighting." Eighteen 
percent insisted, "The Mujahideen and the parties would not 
fight among themselves as long as there was an Islamic 
government." 
Many Afghans have been seriously injured by anti-
personnel mines planted in Afghanistan. When asked if they 
would return before the mines were removed, 65 percent said 
they would not, while 32 percent said they would go back, 
that it was their duty to help remove the mines. 
The factors that were found to affect willingness to 
return under these various conditions included; number and 
age of dependents, time in refuge, geographic distance 
travelled, economic opportunities in Pakistan, minority 
group membership, and fear for future personal safety. 
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The best general description that can be made about the 
Afghan flight and possible repatriation, and all refugee 
flights, is that it is a process or cycle encompassing two 
countries and the interplay of factors or "pushes" and 
"pulls" between them. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
factors affecting the repatriation of the Afghan refugees 
that were living in Pakistan in 1988 by using data collected 
in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in the fall of 1988. 
The analysis should be understood in the context of the 
conditions existing at the time the data were collected. 
The most important conditions included the presence of the 
Soviets in Afghanistan, the belief that a Soviet withdrawal 
would result in an immediate collapse of the Communist 
regime in Kabul, and the possible return of King Zahir Shah. 
This thesis will examine major factors that help explain why 
some refugees say they will return while others say they 
will not. 
DEFINITION OF REFUGEE 
Refugees are usually defined as those people fleeing 
their country out of fear of persecution or physical injury 
from forces within the country. The 1951 convention on 
protocol of the United Nations, adopted by the United 
Nations High Commission on Refugees, classifies a refugee as 
follows: 
Any person who owing to a well founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it (United 
Nations 1951). 
MODELS OF POPULATION FLOWS 
The flight into or out of a country by refugees can be 
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seen as a special type of migration or population flow. The 
initial model of population flows was developed by 
Ravenstein (1885). Migrations and decisions to migrate were 
measured along a simple linear continuum of pluses and 
minuses. If more pluses then minuses are present, movement 
(migration) occurs. This model was applied only to 
migration and never directly to refugee flight or 
repatriation. 
This first work of Ravenstein was based on the British 
census for 1881. In 1889, Ravenstein wrote a second paper, 
based on data from more than twenty countries. The laws 
put forth by Ravenstein may be summarized thusly: 1. 
Migration is usually only a short distance, i.e., the 
further the distance the less the number of migrants; 2. 
Migration is usually in stages, i.e., those close to a large 
city will migrate to it when economic opportunity warrants, 
and those in more rural areas will fill their places; 3. 
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There are streams and counter streams in migrations; 4. 
There are urban and rural differences in propensity to 
migrate, i.e., rural populations are more likely to migrate 
than are urban populations; 5. Short distance migrants are 
predominantly female, i.e., in short distance migrations 
females tend to outnumber men; 6. The development of 
technology tends to promote greater rates of migration; 7. 
Economic factors tend to dominate motives for migration, 
i.e., many factors can cause migration, but the most 
important is the desire for people to improve the economic 
situation (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). Initially Ravenstein was 
criticized for presenting work that would in fact seem to 
support the idea that migration was lawless, or that 
Ravenstein had formulated his laws in such a way that they 
could not be criticized (Lee 1966, pp. 47-48). Despite the 
original criticisms of Ravenstein's laws and the subsequent 
criticisms that have followed in the last one hundred years, 
Ravenstein's work remains the basic foundation of all work 
that was to follow. 
The model of Ravenstein has since been modified into a 
model of migration based on not a "plus/minus" scheme but a 
"push/pull" process. This "push/pull" process was 
elaborated by Everetts. Lee (1966). Lee used the push-pull 
process in his work on the concept of intervening obstacles 
and their effect on migrations. Lee's formulation showed 
migration to be a result of "pushes" and "pulls" or 
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"attractions" and "repulsions" at both the origin as well as 
the destination; these pushes and pulls included such 
factors as climate, good schools and taxes. Lee also 
identified the effect of intervening obstacles, such factors 
as geographic distance or physical obstacles. Lee went on 
to note that it was difficult to identify exact factors for 
any given person (Lee 1966). 
Donald Bogue's work, Principles of Demography, (1969), 
identifies such "push" factors as decline in national 
resources, loss of employment, oppressive treatment of 
political, ethnic, and religious minorities, and 
catastrophes such as fire, flood and drought. He also 
expanded the list of "pull" factors to include superior 
opportunities for employment, preferable environment and 
living conditions, and dependency of persons to whom one is 
related. 
A more complete model, and the first one applicable to 
refugees' flows, is the process model of Egon F. Kunz 
(1981). Kunz's model recognizes the importance of numerous 
dimensions in factors affecting refugee flows. Kunz 
identifies two types of factors, a home related dimension, 
and a host related dimension. Kunz, however, only discusses 
the flow from the home country to the host country and does 
not apply his model to repatriation. 
In one of the most complete works on factors affecting 
refugee repatriation, Joshua Akol (1987) described a number 
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of specific social factors as influencing the rate of return 
among the Sudanese population. These included the economic 
situation in the home country as well as the political 
situation and how they affected the refugees' desire to 
return. 
Other research has identified other aspects affecting 
repatriation. Jeff Crisp identified the importance of time 
as an intervening variable in his study of African refugees 
(July 1987). Sidni Lamb identified the importance of 
economic considerations in the return of Ethiopian refugees 
(1986). Richard Lawless and Liela Monihan, in their work on 
Moroccan refugees, showed the importance of human rights 
considerations and their effect on return (1987). Stephan 
Keller and his work on the partition of India shows how 
ethnic and religious conflicts can precipitate a massive 
migration (1975). 
THE PROCESS MODEL OF KUNZ 
The Process Model of Egon F. Kunz (1981) is useful in 
that Kunz breaks down factors into both a home related 
dimension and a host related dimension. The factors that 
Kunz identifies in the home related category are as follows: 
the identification of the refugee with other groups in the 
country; the attitude of the refugee in flight; and the 
ideological national orientation abroad of the refugee. 
The identification of the refugee with other groups in 
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the country can be broken down into three categories. The 
first is "The Majority-Identified, those refugees who are 
firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events 
is shared by the majority of their compatriots." Secondly, 
Kunz identifies "The Events-Alienated, those who either 
because of events immediately preceding the refugee 
situation, or because of past discrimination are ambivalent 
or embittered towards their compatriots." Thirdly, "The 
Self-Alienated, those who, for varied individual reasons or 
philosophies have no wish to identify with the rest of the 
nation" (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43). 
When Kunz considers the attitude of the refugee towards 
flight he identifies two different attitudes. The first is 
the "Reactive Fate Group;" these are the refugees of wars, 
sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions. Secondly, are 
the "Purpose Groups;" the Purpose Groups are identified as 
usually being makers of their own situation in that they may 
espouse "a certain facet of belief or ideology or a form of 
society that is in opposition or inconsistent with the 
majority society" (Kunz 1981, pp. 44-45). 
Next, Kunz identifies the orientation of the refugee in 
exile which he terms "Ideological National Orientation in 
Exile." The orientation includes six basic types: 
"Restoration Activists," those who want to restore their 
nation to the previous situation; "Passive Hurt," those who 
retire resigned to the situation; "Integration Realists," 
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those realizing the reality of the situation and seek 
integration; "Eager Assimilationists," those who to escape 
guilt hyperactively seek assimilation; "Revolutionary 
Activists," those who turn their energies to preparing a 
revolution which would change the government and lifestyle 
in their homeland; and "Founders of Utopias," those who turn 
their backs on the host society and form ideologically-
inspired idealist colonies (Kunz 1981, pp. 45-46). 
Finally, Kunz identifies factors in the host country 
which impact resettlement in the host country. One host 
factor is cultural compatibility, including such areas as 
language, values, tradition, religion, politics, food and 
interpersonal relations. Another host factor is government 
policies toward immigrant populations. The two types of 
policies Kunz identifies are: "Augmentative," in which "the 
host societies are likely to look at the refugee as a sought 
after and valued immigrant who is expected to contribute to 
the nation's numerical growth and its economic capacity," 
(Kunz 1981, pg.48) and secondly "Self-sufficient," 
identified as 
demographically self-sufficient countries which 
are less likely to accept large numbers of 
refugees. Because they are not particularly 
anxious to retain and assimilate new arrivals they 
are less likely to press the refugee to abandon a 
home orientated outlook and activities (Kunz 1981, 
pg. 48). 
Finally Kunz considers attitudes of the host society 
towards refugees. He identifies three attitudes: "Monastic-
assimilationist," "Pluralistic-integrationist," and 
"Sanctuary societies-tolerant" (Kunz 1981, pg. 47). 
"FACTORS AFFECTING REFUGEE FLOWS 
While Kunz's scheme is ambitious and very descriptive, 
it does not address the issue of repatriation in a 
satisfactory way. For example, it considers factors to be 
different between the home country and host country. Based 
on the previous models of migration and the factors 
identified by refugee writers, similar factors can be 
identified in both the host and home country (Bogue 1969). 
By considering factors in the home and host country as 
falling into generally similar spheres it is easier to 
predict flight, resettlement, and possible repatriation. 
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When looking at refugee flows and the factors affecting 
them, one finds a patterning among types of factors. The 
types of factors are (1) political issues (Akal 1987, Bogue 
1969); (2) geographic obstacles (Lee 1966); (3) human-rights 
and safety concerns (Bogue 1969, Lawless and Monihan 1987); 
(4) social, culture, ethnic, or religious issues (Bogue 
1969, Keller 1975); and (5) economic concerns or 
opportunities (Akal 1987, Bogue 1969, Lamb 1986). These 
factors must be considered in both the host country of 
refuge and the home country (Bogue 1969, Kunz 1981). Both 
must be considered when looking at refugee flows and 
possible refugee repatriation. 
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Factors in the political sphere which may provoke 
flight include war, invasion, civil war, and changes in 
government. These would all be factors causing flight (Akol 
1987~ Bogue 1969). Refugees fleeing these conditions would 
be a part of a reactive fate group (Kunz 1981). These same 
factors, if causing a flight, must be addressed for a return 
to occur. 
Geographic obstacles such as rivers, mountains, oceans, 
and distances are all factors that affect flight as well as 
return. These may be identified as intervening obstacles 
(Lee 1966). 
In the human rights sphere factors include torture, 
murder, illegal detention and repression of countries' 
citizens, whether by their own government and people or by 
outside forces. Refugees fleeing these conditions would 
also be identified as members of a reactive fate group (Kunz 
1981). Again, these factors must be addressed in the home 
country for a full and voluntary repatriation to take place. 
In the socio-cultural sphere conflicts arise among 
groups of people due to tribal affiliation, ethnic heritage, 
language or religious preference (Bogue 1969, Keller 1975). 
And finally, in the economic sphere there are a number 
of factors. These are natural disasters, such as floods, 
droughts, epidemics and pestilences (Bogue 1969). And then 
there are those economic conditions that are man-made. Man-
made economic factors may be purposeful or unintended. 
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Theft of government funds and inappropriate use of funds are 
just as devastating to a country as when its economy is run 
by inept and untrained people (Akol 1987). 
The various factors that have been previously described 
have positive and negative effects. This means that events 
such as civil war, torture or starvation are factors that 
will repel a group of people whether at home or in a host 
country. This is a negative force or a "push" (Lee 1966). 
Events such as the end of a civil war, the ouster of a 
brutal regime, economic development or aid are all positive 
and have a positive value; this is a "pull" (Lee 1966) and 
will draw people back. Often just the removal of a negative 
factor, such as a civil war, is a positive charge to draw 
the refugees home. When a refugee flow is precipitated, 
there is often some strong negative "push" such as civil 
war, or economic deprivation, or ethnic strife. 
The choice of the refugees' asylum is determined first 
by geographic consideration, such as being the nearest 
country. The nearest country would have the strongest 
positive "pull" in the geographic sphere. However, the host 
government's treatment and policies about refugees can be 
positive or negative (Kunz 1981). Other considerations are 
cultural compatibility and economic opportunity. 
Most often refugees leave with some crisis 
precipitating the flow. For instance, economic hardship and 
ethnic conflict may have been tolerated for some time, but 
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with the outbreak of civil war the refugee decides it is 
finally time to leave. There usually has to be some strong 
"push" combined with some sort of "pull" from a host 
country in order to get a refugee to leave his or her home 
country. Most people are extremely resistant to having to 
leave their country. Once the refugee flow has taken place 
and refugees are in a host country, the decision to return 
is based on what factors have been addressed in the home 
country that caused the refugee's flight, as well as the 
"pulls" to remain in the host country. 
For example, if there has been a civil war and an 
oppressive government that has driven refugees to a host 
country, and they are supported in that host country in a 
humane and dignified way, there will be little impetus to 
return home until the factors causing flight in the home 
country have been resolved. The factors that "pulled" a 
refugee to the host country may be strong enough to keep him 
or her there even though conditions in the home country 
improve. 
In many of the repatriation flows, not only were there 
strong "pulls" to return home from the host country, but 
often there have been simultaneous "pushes" to leave a host 
country. 
Many cases show that time becomes more important as 
more of it passes (Crisp, July 1987). The longer the 
refugees are out of their country, the greater the chance 
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they will be assimilated into the host country. In turn, 
the greater the assimilation, the less the chance they will 
return home. Another consideration of time is that the 
longer the refugees are out of their country, the greater 
the chance that their means of support in their home country 
will disappear (whether it is the fields and irrigation 
systems of farmers being ruined, or someone's job 
disappearing, or a business being left unattended), and the 
greater the likelihood they will be made into economic 
refugees. 
When considering a model of factors in refugee flows, 
the spheres of factors can be arranged in order of their 
degree of impact based on whether the factor is a crisis to 
react to, such as a political coup or human rights abuses, 
or a more long term problem such as economic problems and 
socio-cultural conflicts. 
Time should be considered in several different ways. 
One way is the time it takes the various factors to occur 
and be resolved. At the top of the hierarchy of factors is 
the political sphere. Coups and civil wars can erupt in 
days or hours and, just as quickly, be resolved. Human 
rights abuses take more time to develop as a problem to 
which citizens react. They probably will not leave at the 
first sign of abuse, but as the abuse continues they are 
forced to flee for their own safety. These abuses take 
longer to address as well. 
The socio-cultural conflicts take even longer to 
develop, often generations, and can cause very deep rooted 
and long term resentment and hostilities that will take 
decades to overcome. 
Finally, economic hardships can result from war or 
corruption or simply be faults or flaws in the 
infrastructure of the home country that may have been 
developed over generations. A ruined economy, depleted 
natural resources, or severe drought or other natural 
disaster cannot be made up for over night. Economic 
problems may take the longest to resolve and are often the 
hardest to solve. 
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In addition, the more time that passes after a 
precipitating crisis, such as a coup, without a consensual 
resolution, the greater the chance that the refugee will be 
affected in other spheres. For instance, what starts out as 
a political crisis and drives refugees out of the country, 
if allowed to continue long enough, will result in economic 
hardship. Aging of the refugees and changes of family 
structure will also occur over time. 
THE WORLDWIDE REFUGEE SITUATION 
If history tells us one thing it is that repatriation 
is the exception instead of the rule in refugee flows. 
Pakistan, Israel, and the United States of America, among 
many nations, are all the result of extensive flows that 
will never result in repatriation. The persons involved 
neither want it nor seek it. There are, however, many 
refugee flows that have resulted in repatriation. 
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By looking at the factors that affect refugee flows and 
the role these factors play in subsequent repatriation of a 
refugee population, it is possible to predict the outcome of 
current or future flows. The following sections will first 
focus on the literature that identifies these factors. Past 
and present refugee flows will be addressed to determine 
what these factors are. 
Secondly, models of migrations will be presented and 
used as a foundation from which to work. The previous work 
of Egon F. Kunz, Everett s. Lee, and Donald Bogue will be 
addressed and incorporated into the description of the 
process. The general hypotheses derived from the literature 
will then be tested against the information I collected 
during my interviews of Afghan refugees who fled to 
Pakistan. 
The following section on examples of refugee flows is 
based on work which I originally presented in 1988, in a 
report called "Factors Of Repatriation: The Return to 
Afghanistan," whose chief authors were Grant Farr and John 
Lorenz. 
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NORTH AFRICA 
Algeria is a good example of a simple refugee flow that 
was followed shortly afterwards by repatriation of virtually 
the entire refugee population. The Independence War that 
rocked Algeria in 1960 was enough to set off a refugee flow 
which resulted in over 200,000 fleeing over Algerian borders 
into Tunisia and Morocco (Crisp, July 1987). 
The two major factors which accounted for this flow 
were, first, the political issue of the war and, second, the 
issue of human rights and a fear for personal safety. The 
fear of war pushed the refugees out of Algeria. This would 
be an example of a reactive fate group, in that they fled 
due to a war (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). They fled to two of the 
nearest countries which had cultures and customs similar to 
Algeria. This would be considered a "host related factor of 
cultural compatibility" (Kunz 1981, pg. 47). The refugees 
who fled were only out of their country for a short time 
(two years), insuring that little assimilation into the host 
country took place. Because of the short time, time did not 
become a intervening variable (Crisp, July 1987). With the 
arrangement of the cease fire in 1962, virtually all the 
refugees spontaneously returned to Algeria (Crisp, July 
1987) . 
Because little assimilation took place, because the 
time involved was so short, and the primary factor (a war) 
was resolved, repatriation took place. In other words, the 
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"pulls" home overcame the "pushes" that had kept people from 
returning, and movement occurred (Bogue 1969, Lee 1966). 
The Afghans, in comparison, have been assimilated to a high 
degree in Pakistan, and, even though the Soviets have left, 
and the communist government has collapsed, sporadic 
fighting continues, thus little repatriation has taken 
place. 
In the case of the Western Sahara and Morocco, human 
rights dominated the situation. For the people of the 
Western Sahara the decision by Morocco to invade and 
actively oppress the local population in the 1980's was the 
driving force causing the refugees to flee to the 
neighboring country of Algeria. In all, a total of over 
200,000 ended up fleeing Morocco into Algeria (Lawless and 
Monihan 1987). Morocco is maintaining its policy of 
oppression and kidnapping, which has so far insured that no 
repatriation has taken place. These refugees also would 
fall under the definition of being reactive fate refugees. 
In the above situation, the same factors that had 
originally driven the refugees out, human rights issues and 
harsh political treatment, continue. There is no 
indication, at this time, that any changes will occur. In 
fact the recent discovery of oil deposits in the area will 
surely exacerbate the problem. The "pushes" that drove the 
refugees out continue, with no counteracting "pulls" to 
bring them back. Hence no repatriation has taken place. 
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The situation in Morocco is similar to the Afghan 
situation in that most of the same factors - war, opposition 
to communism, and harsh political and human rights 
situations - remain. The factors that pushed the Afghans 
out remain, and the refugees remain in host countries. 
MIDDLE EAST 
Lebanon currently has one of the most chaotic refugee 
situations in the world. What has taken place in Lebanon 
cannot even be considered a civil war in the true sense of 
the word; gang wars may be a truer representation. This 
situation is further complicated by the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Because of the armed violence and continued 
threat to life, there are Palestinian refugees internally 
and Lebanese refugees externally totaling somewhere around 
263,000 (Barnes 1985). The Palestinian refugees would be 
considered "The Majority-Identified, in which their 
opposition to the events are shared by the majority of their 
compatriots" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42). The Lebanese would 
probably fall into two categories, "The Majority-Identified 
and Events-Alienated, because of events prior to the refugee 
situation or past discrimination, are ambivalent or 
embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots" 
(Kunz 1981, pg. 42). Because of the continuation of the 
strong negative factors there has been no return as of yet. 
Here, like Afghanistan, threat of physical violence is a 
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very strong deterrent to return. These refugees would also 
be classified as a reactive fate group. 
AFRICAN REFUGEE FLOWS 
Uganda has a tragic history of suffering and terror 
dating back through the last two decades. While Idi Amin 
holds a special place in the world's memory for flagrant 
human rights abuses, Oboto, upon deposing Amin, was only 
more discreet, but certainly no less brutal. Estimates of 
murdered Ugandans for the three years before Oboto's removal 
in 1986, range anywhere from 500,000 to 2 million. The 
Ugandans would be considered a reactive fate group. For the 
past 20 years in Uganda, each successive leader has 
brutalized his tribe's ethnic enemies. The Ugandans would 
be a combination of the majority-identified and the events-
alienated (Kunz 1981). Even the latest revolutionary 
president, Mesevini, has not been able to halt this type of 
terror. When this is combined with the economic chaos and 
damaged infrastructure of the country, it is remarkable that 
anyone is left in Uganda. Those who have fled have gone to 
the Sudan, Kenya and Rwanda. Not surprisingly, the Ugandans 
fled to the nearest countries. It appears that Ravenstein's 
first law of "migration and distance" would apply in that 
they fled to the nearest countries (Ravenstein 1889). 
These countries also are culturally compatible, 
providing further "pulls" (Bogue 1969, Lee 1981). Because 
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of the ongoing civil war, plus outside intervention (as in 
the case of Tanzanian forces aiding in the return of Oboto 
in 1982), coupled with an undisciplined and unrestrained 
army, ·the once extensive plantations of coffee, pineapple, 
and tea have been ruined. Uganda's once extensive tourist 
trade is completely destroyed. It is safe to say that 
Uganda has no economy other than at a subsistence level. 
The economic situation in the home country can provide a 
"push" to keep people from returning (Akol 1987). 
Therefore, repatriation has been questionable, at best, 
in many cases. During 1983, refugees in the Yei River 
district from the Sudan returned despite continuing battles 
within earshot of many of the refugee camps. One 21 years 
old returnee explained that he would return despite threats 
from the military: 
I will not forget the hard times in the Sudan. I 
have gone hungry for a long time. In the 
settlements I have been laboring for food, now I 
feel it is unbearable. So I decided to 
repatriate. Quite a many people had died and I 
fear I would die since the medical services are 
not quite adequate (Harrell-Bond 1986, pg. 167). 
It would appear that one set of fears about threats to life 
and health may outweigh others. The Ugandans who have fled 
into the Sudan have for the most part been kept in camps 
with no real opportunity for work or assimilation into the 
local economies. This has certainly provided a "push" to 
leave the host country. This might be an area where Kunz's 
scheme would benefit from expanding his list of host related 
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factors to include a population policy of what I term 
"separatist/non-tolerant." Unfortunately the vast majority 
of refugees fleeing undeveloped countries flee to 
neighboring countries which neither can afford nor want them 
to be assimilated. For the Ugandans the chronic problems 
that they have suffered will indicate how, over time, one 
problem leads to another. 
In Uganda what began as an oppressive and badly run 
government slowly translated into ethnic conflicts as first 
one tribe and then another gained control of the government. 
Each successive wave of refugees meant that crops were 
neglected, stores were closed, and all commerce ceased. 
Even those refugees who wish to return under the newest 
government and its promises for the future would find no 
effective economy and very little food. 
The Ugandan crisis is especially significant in its 
similarities to the Afghan situation. In both cases the 
overthrow of a government resulted in harsh human rights 
violations. In both cases a long term conflict has meant 
extensive damage to the economic infrastructure, and in both 
cases the violence and damage have been so extensive people 
are afraid to return. 
ASIAN REFUGEE FLOWS 
Burma saw over 17,000 of its citizens flee to Thailand 
as a result of the Civil War between the government and 
21 
guerrilla forces. The majority who fled did so simply due 
to a well founded fear for their lives. This would 
undoubtedly be considered a human rights situation resulting 
from a political confrontation (Kumin 1987). Because of the 
continuing armed strife people don't want to return. This 
is a strong, negative push in the political sphere and human 
rights sphere, which, in turn, pushes returnees away. These 
refugees are an example of a "Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 
19 81 ' pg . 4 4 ) . 
Burma is a good example to compare Afghanistan to in 
that it illustrates what happens to refugees when an armed 
struggle between the government and guerilla forces is 
ongoing. 
Another example is Laos, which has a refugee flow made 
up of those fleeing the continuing civil war and the human 
rights issues involved in it. The Laotians would be 
considered a "Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). In 
addition, due to the Civil War, economic opportunities were 
extremely limited, causing many to flee for hope of a better 
economic situation. Many have fled, some even repeatedly, 
to Thailand in the hopes of better economic opportunities 
{Crisp, September 1987). This is a case where the economic 
situation in the home country has provided a "push" out of 
the home country (Akol 1987). The return to Laos was 
initiated by an end to hostilities, tight restrictions on 
economic opportunities in Thailand, as well as U.N.H.C.R. 
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assistance for those who return. (Naef 1987). 
So for the Laotian refugees, the original reasons for 
flE~eing (the civil war and the poor economy) had been 
addressed by the ending of the war and by provision of some 
aid from the U.N.H.C.R. The forces that had originally 
forced the refugees out (pushes) had been removed and 
positive forces (pulls), to draw the refugees back, had been 
put in their place. The Thai government was providing a 
strong push for refugees to repatriate with its limiting of 
economic opportunities. The Laos refugee situation is the 
reverse of the Afghan situation. The reasons pushing 
refugees out of Afghanistan have not been resolved, nor have 
the Afghan refugees been pushed out of Pakistan. Not 
surprisingly, there has been very little impetus for the 
Afghans to return home. 
Vietnam's recent armed conflict and oppressive regime 
have resulted in flows into Thailand and Cambodia totaling 
onE~ million (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1985). This is the 
result of a strong negative push to leave the country, in 
the area of political and human rights factors. Again these 
would be "Reactive Fate Refugees" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). 
Because of the continuation of these factors, it is not yet 
possible for refugees to return home. As illustrated here, 
if the original negative factors, continue there is every 
indication that repatriation will not occur. Like 
Afghanistan, the continued unacceptable regime has kept 
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refugees from returning. 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
El Salvador has had a history of military control over 
its population. The 1932 peasant uprising was violently 
smashed by the ruling plantation owners and the military. 
Government opposition and social unrest have been dealt with 
harshly ever since. Murder, torture, political kidnapping 
and assassinations have been rampant since the 1970's. By 
1982, there were over 750,000 El Salvadorans out of the 
country and 500,000 internally displaced (Billiard, December 
1987). The majority of these refugees went to Honduras 
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where they were confined to refugee camps. For refugees 
from El Salvador it is obvious that they fled their country 
over political issues that have spawned human rights abuses. 
Once again, these refugees would be considered a "Reactive 
Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). 
The Salvadorans would probably be considered "The 
Majority-Identified and The Events-Alienated" (Kunz 1981, 
pg. 42). This would be due to the large majority of the 
population being involved combined with the class conflicts 
evident in the situation. For the Salvadorans, the 
predominant forces have been a push out of the country. 
Repatriation has been due mainly to the decline of 
hostilities and a quieting of the social chaos. However, 
this has been coupled with the negative factor of being 
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imprisoned while in the Honduran refugee camps. In this 
unusual circumstance, there is a pull to return home in the 
human rights sphere, yet there is also a push from the 
country of refuge, the negative push of human rights 
infringement by restricting refugees (Billiard, December 
1987). As illustrated by Richard Lawless and Liela Monihan 
in their work on Moroccan refugees (1987), human rights 
concerns can have a big impact on willingness to return; in 
this case it has provided a push out of the host country. 
This case has been the opposite of the Afghan situation 
in that the Afghan political and human rights situation has 
not been resolved, yet the Pakistan government has treated 
the Afghans fairly well, giving them refuge, allowing them 
to come and go from their camps, and even allowing them to 
use Pakistan as a staging base for attacks on Afghanistan. 
Guatemala is similar to El Salvador in that its current 
political crisis is rooted in a historic pattern of 
dominance by the landed elite supported by the military and 
U.S. business interests, particularly United Fruit Company. 
When Jacobo Arbenz enacted agrarian reform in 1954, it was 
not long before he was ousted in a C.I.A. backed coup which 
placed Col. Castillo Armas in power. Since 1954, military 
governments have altered history with fraudulent elections, 
to insure and provide uninterrupted repressive rule in 
Guatemala (Ferris 1987). As in the case of El Salvador, 
these refugees are "The Majority-Identified and The Events-
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Alienated" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42). 
Death squads and the systematic elimination of any 
moderate opposition created a climate of widespread fear 
and terror throughout the country. With the elimination of 
opposition leaders, guerrilla organizations became the only 
recognized opposition. Any indigenous populations who 
opposed the government or aided the guerrillas were 
destroyed (Ferris 1987). The refugees fleeing are a 
"Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). The flow out of 
Guatemala has been mainly of the Indian population. 
Currently there are over 45,000 in Mexico. After the 1984 
raids on the border refugee camps, the Mexican government 
moved the refugees to locations away from the borders. 
As in the case of El Salvador, the armed military rule 
has resulted in oppressive treatment of the population and 
extensive human rights abuses. This is another case where 
the crisis is initiated by political conflicts but it is 
manifested as a human rights crisis. This created pushes to 
drive the Indians out of their country. With the continued 
unrest and attacks on refugee camps, there is a strong 
negative force keeping refugees from returning home. 
Those refugees that did return were placed in "model" 
villages to be "re-educated." These types of acts serve to 
reinforce the fears of those contemplating return (Maldonado 
1986). They would be the recipients of human-rights abuse. 
As illustrated by Lawless and Monihan (1987) and Bogue 
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(1969), human rights issues can have a strong effect or be a 
push, blocking return. 
As in Afghanistan, when the original reasons for 
fleeing remain, refugees do not return. 
Haiti has gained a sort of infamy for its particularly 
harsh violation of human rights. The Duvalier regime in 
Haiti is the western version of Idi Amin in Uganda. The 
government was notorious for violating human rights with the 
help of the military. All of these factors taking place over 
a long period of time reduced the Haitian economy to a 
shambles. The majority of its flow was into the Dominican 
Republic and the United states. Many fled due to the 
oppressive regime in Haiti. Many more, however, fled 
because they were economically destitute. As both Akol 
(1987) and Lamb (1986) have noted, the economic situation in 
the home country can be a tremendous force in creating a 
refugee flow, or in keeping them from returning. 
The initial returnees came back with the fall of the 
Duvalier regime. There were reports that some of the 
initial returnees were forced out of their countries of 
asylum. Those that had fled for economic considerations 
have adopted a wait and see attitude to determine if there 
are economic opportunities available for them once they 
return. Many of the refugees who had fled for political 
reasons cite the poor economy as a reason to delay return 
(Billiard, March 1987). Haiti is another example supporting 
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Akol's (1987) position on the impact that the economic 
situation in the host country can have. Certainly the 
current 1991-1992 crisis in Haiti, while precipitated by a 
coup and political persecution, has also been a response to 
the economic problems of the country. 
This is a good case to compare to the Afghans' 
situation, in theft refugees fleeing for one reason in the 
interim now have other reasons not to return. 
AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan currently has five to six million refugees 
in Pakistan and Iran (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1985). 
The Afghans would be considered "The Majority-Identified" 
(Kunz 1981, pg. 42). The Afghan flows were precipitated by 
the communist coup of 1978, and the subsequent Soviet 
invasion and occupation to support the communist regime in 
Kabul (Fullerton 1983). The Afghans would be considered a 
"Reactive Fate Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44), because of heavy 
protest by the Afghans, a protracted guerrilla war and a 
Soviet "scorched earth" policy resulting in extensive 
damage to the economic infrastructure and agricultural 
capabilities. The initial forces which drove out many 
Afghans were political ones, naturally followed by refugees 
responding to human rights issues. Finally, due to time and 
continued damage, most of the Afghan refugees have been 
turned into economic refugees as well. 
28 
The Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran where there were 
similar cultural backgrounds and where they have been fairly 
well received and cared for. This would be considered a 
"Host Related Factor of Cultural Compatibility" (Kunz 1981, 
pg. 47). For the Afghans, the issues at home, combined with 
the sympathy and aid in their host countries, provide very 
powerful forces to keep the Afghans from returning home. 
The Afghans in exile have maintained a strong "homeward 
identity view" (Kunz 1981, pg. 48). Under Kunz's scheme 
they would be considered to have an "Ideological National 
Orientation in Exile of Restoration Activists" (Kunz 1981, 
pg. 45) . 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REFUGEE FLOWS 
Some assumptions that can be drawn from the previously 
listed flows are as follows. First, if the reasons, or most 
of the reasons (pushes), that drove the refugees out of 
their homeland continue to exist, they will not return 
(Bogue 1969, Lee 1966). 
Secondly, if the conditions which hold refugees to the 
host country continue (pulls), they will not be likely to 
return (Bogue 1969, Lee 1966). 
Thirdly, the refugees most likely to return will be 
those that have had the conditions driving them out of their 
home country removed and are then "pushed" out of their host 
country by refoulment (forced return) or some other factor 
which discourage their assimilation into the host society 
(Bogue 1969). 
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Fourthly, the refugees least likely to return will be 
those that have the conditions that "pushed" them out of 
their home country continue and have conditions that "pull" 
them to their host country continue, such as refuge, aid, 
and support (Bogue 1969). 
The category that the Afghan refugees would fall under 
would be the last: the conditions driving them out have not 
been resolved, and they have had a good reception in 
Pakistan with refuge, aid and support. 
Fifth, and perhaps most important, in practice 
repatriation is the exception rather than the rule. 
The most common types of large refugee flows that have 
taken place in this century are made up of "Reactive Fate 
Groups" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). Secondly, the largest flights 
tend to be "The Majority-Identified" (Kunz 1981, pg. 42). 
Third, refugees tend to flee to countries that they are the 
closest to (Ravenstein 1889). Finally, refugees flee to 
countries that have "Cultural Compatibility" (Kunz 1981). 
CHAPTER II 
HYPOTHESES 
Based on a combination of the works of the previously 
presented authors and the common characteristics identified 
among world wide refugee flows, it is possible to derive a 
number of hypotheses. The following list of hypotheses is 
broken down into three areas: basic independent variables, 
intervening variables that have arisen during the Afghans' 
refuge, and personal perception variables of the Afghans 
interviewed. These hypotheses will be tested with the data 
collected during 1988, and contrasted with recent historical 
and political developments. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Reason For Flight 
The obstacles to repatriation will vary in relation to 
the original reasons for fleeing. I.e., the greater the 
number of factors causing flight that still exist in the 
home country, the less the chance of repatriation. 
Age 
The relationship between age and probability of 
repatriation is curvilinear. I.e., the very young will 
return with their parents. Those in their late teens, 
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having been out of the country their whole lives, will have 
less likelihood of repatriating. Those in their early 
twenties and upward to middle age will have a high chance of 
repatriating due to their strong attachments. And the very 
old, due to infirmity, will have a lower likelihood of 
repatriating. 
Family Status 
The concerns about safety will vary with the number of 
dependents. I.e., the more dependents, the greater will be 
the perceived concerns about personal safety and therefore 
greater reluctance to repatriate. 
INTERVENING VARIABLES 
Time 
The greater the time that a refugee has been out of the 
home country, the less the likelihood of repatriation. 
I.e., the longer a refugee is in a host country, the greater 
the chance he or she will have of being assimilated into 
various spheres of that society. 
Ideological Shift 
Besides causing a greater assimilation over time, time 
will also be associated with a shift among concerns. There 
are several directions this shift will go. The general 
population will shift to more pragmatic concerns over time, 
while the ideological leaders will shift more towards 
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ideological concerns. 
Geographic 
The greater the distance or other geographic obstacles, 
the less the likelihood of repatriation •. I.e., those who 
traveled the farthest will have the greatest obstacles for 
return. 
Economic 
Host: The greater the degree of economic assimilation 
in the host country, the less the likelihood of 
repatriation. 
Socio-Cultural 
Host: The less the socio-cultural similarity with the 
host society the greater the likelihood of repatriation. 
I.e., the refugees who are Pushtun and staying in a Pushtun 
part of Pakistan would have less reason to repatriate than a 
Tajik or Hazara staying in a Pushtun area. 
PERSONAL PERCEPTION VARIABLES 
Economic 
Home: The greater the perceived economic opportunities 
at home, the greater the likelihood of repatriation. I.e. , 
the refugees who have jobs in Pakistan, but no immediate 
chance of work in Afghanistan, should therefore have less of 
a desire to repatriate than a refugee farmer who is not 
working in Pakistan but can begin farming in Afghanistan as 
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soon as he is able to return home. 
Socio-Cultural 
Home: The greater the socio-cultural similarity with 
the home population, the greater the likelihood of 
repatriation. I.e., those refugees who were minorities in 
Afghanistan would be less inclined to repatriate to an area 
where they would be an ethnic or religious minorities. 
Personal Safety 
Home: The less the fear for personal safety from 
fighting or mines and comparable hazards to health, the 
greater the chance of repatriation. 
CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND OF AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION 
GEOGRAPHY 
Geography has always had an impact on refugees; it 
helps determine who leaves and from what area, where they go 
to, and how difficult it will be for them to return and 
reestablish themselves. Geography is an important factor in 
the repatriation of the Afghan refugees. Afghanistan is a 
country of great geographical diversity. Afghanistan's 
extensive mountain ranges, the Hindu Kush and the Pamir Knot 
(an extension of the Himalayas), dominate the country 
throughout the northeast, the east, the southeast and the 
center of the country. To the west and north are extensive 
plains and to the south and southwest are sand and stone 
deserts. Afghanistan is mostly semi-desert ecologically 
and is landlocked by its neighbors. To the north, 
Afghanistan is bordered by the former republics of the 
Soviet Union, to the west by Iran, to the south and east by 
Pakistan, and to the northeast it shares a tiny border with 
China. 
Afghan refugee movement started in 1978; many Afghans 
fled on foot, by donkey or local transport. As a result 
they crossed the borders of Afghanistan into one of their 
two immediate neighbors, Pakistan or Iran. (See map of the 
region, Figure 1.) 
HISTORY 
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The west tends to view the Afghan situation as 
beginning in 1979 with the Soviet invasion, when in fact it 
is the final step in a historical process which has been 
playing itself out for centuries. The Afghans themselves 
view what has happened in a historical context. For most, 
this was one of many invasions and occupations by foreign 
powers. And just as the Greeks, the Persians, the Turks and 
the British were finally driven out, so would the Soviets 
and the Communists finally be overthrown. Several elder 
Afghan men I spoke to talked about the Third Anglo-Afghan 
war in 1919, as though it had happened yesterday. 
Afghanistan has been invaded several times in modern 
history. Afghanistan's relationship with the modern world 
community begins with the rise of Napoleon at the end of the 
eighteenth century. His successes created heightened 
interest in Asia and India. British distrust of Russia grew 
following the Russian attack on Iran and subsequent treaties 
which supported the siege of Herat. Russia then began 
diplomatic maneuvering in the Afghan court of Dost Mohamad, 
leading to the British invading Afghanistan in 1838 in what 
became known as the First Anglo Afghan War (Smith 1973, pg. 
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The British took over Qandahar and Kabul and drove Dost 
Mohamad to the north and then placed Shah Shuja on the 
throne as Amir. Shah Shuja was dependent on the British 
troops to keep him in power. However, tribal animosities 
grew until 1842 when, in an Afghan uprising, the 15,000 
British were massacred at Kabul and in retreat to Jalalabad 
(Smith 1973, pg. 47). The next year the British returned 
and placed Dost Mohamad on the throne as Amir. Despite the 
return of Dost Mohamad, the British had caused so much 
destruction and resentment in Afghanistan that the Afghans 
themselves viewed with suspicion and hatred not only the 
British but all foreigners. 
The Second Anglo-Afghan war, 1878-1879, was 
precipitated by a British policy shift to more direct 
intervention in the country. This caused Amir Sher Ali to 
turn to the Russians for help. When Sher Ali welcomed the 
Russian envoy but refused to accept a British mission, the 
British were so furious they once again invaded Afghanistan 
and drove Sher Ali out of power. (Smith 1973, pg. 49). 
Following Sher Ali's death in 1879, Afghanistan was 
then ruled by Sher Ali's son, Yaquab Khan. The new Amir was 
allowed to rule but only internally. All outside relations 
were handled by the British. In response, five years later, 
in 1885, the Russians invaded and occupied Panjdeh, north of 
Herat. The British response was to rush to defend Herat. 
But instead of a war between these superpowers, a compromise 
was reached and in 1887, what was later to become the 
permanent border between Russia and Afghanistan was 
established (Smith 1973, pg. 49). 
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Following Yaquab Khan's abdication in 1879, (Nyrop 
1986, pg. 33) Abdar Rahman gained the throne and was the 
first ruler to transform Afghanistan into the modern state 
that it is today. Rahman was succeeded after his death in 
1901 by his oldest son, Habibullah (Nyrop 1986, pg. 38). 
During his reign he was able to play Russia off against the 
British. During World War l he offered to attack the 
British for the Turks and Germans in exchange for cash and 
weapons, while at the same time offering to attack the Turks 
and Germans for the British in exchange for an end to 
British control. Habibullah met the classic fate of the 
Afghan monarch. He was assassinated in 1919 under unclear 
and unusual circumstances (Nyrop 1986, pg. 41). 
Amanullah, Abdar Rahman's third son, seized power upon 
Rahman's death despite claims to the throne by his older 
brothers and uncle. Three months later, in May 1919, (Nyrop 
1986, pp. 41), Amanullah attacked the British in what became 
known as the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The war only lasted 
one month and in the years following several agreements 
between the British and Afghans resulted in Afghan autonomy. 
Amanullah built relations with the Soviets during his 
reign which soured the Afghan-British relations. Amanullah 
also brought about many internal reforms including: 
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discouraging the seclusion and veiling of women, abolishing 
slavery, secular education for boys and girls, and 
Afghanistan's first constitution (Nyrop 1986, pg. 45). His 
reforms led to a revolt by the Shinwari and Tajik tribes, 
who forced him from power. 
In 1929 following a seven month rule of a Tajik, 
Habibullah Khan, the next ruler was King Muhammad Nadir 
Shah. His first act was to remove all the reforms of 
Amanullah, his cousin. Nadir Shah did continue to modernize 
Afghanistan with roads, a communication system, a banking 
system, and economic planning. Nadir Shah also was 
assassinated, in 1933 (Nyrop 1986, pg. 49). He was replaced 
by his son, Muhammad Zahir Shah. 
Muhammad Zahir Shah was the last king to rule 
Afghanistan. During his reign he kept the country neutral 
during World War II, wrestled with Pakistan over the control 
of the North West Frontier Province, and established 
relations with the United states of America. In 1950, the 
Afghans established an important agreement with the Soviet 
Union to get Soviet aid in petroleum exploration and 
production and the shipment of goods through Soviet 
territory to Afghanistan. The last had became very 
important, as in the past Pakistan had embargoed goods bound 
to Afghanistan during their disagreements. The most 
important aspect of the agreement though was to counter 
increasing American involvement in Afghanistan, which had 
replaced Britain as the western super-power in the region 
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 56). 
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In 1953, Daoud became Prime Minister of Afghanistan 
(Nyrop 1986, pp. 58). Daoud was unique in that he was the 
first western educated member of the royal family to wield 
power. He continued modernization in the social and 
economic areas. In a reenactment of an earlier era, Daoud 
attempted to play off the superpowers against each other by 
accepting aid from both the Soviets and the Americans. 
Daoud had one great obsession during his reign and that 
was on the issue of Pushtunistan, the tribal area of the 
Pushtuns covering the North East of Afghanistan and the 
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. This area had 
effectively been cut in half by the establishment of the 
Durand line in 1893 by British Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Mortimer Durand (Dupree 1980, pp. 426-427). Pushtunistan 
has been a continuous sore point between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan: would it belong to one country or the other or 
remain split or perhaps become an independent nation? In 
1950 Afghanistan supported an independent Pushtunistan 
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 55). As of 1963, Daoud and his Pakistan 
counterpart had became so entrenched on the Pushtunistan 
issue and the numerous closings of the border and blocking 
of trade had become so bad that King Zahir Shah asked for 
Daoud's resignation because of the harm to Afghanistan's 
economy (Nyrop 1986, pg. 62). 
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so for the first time in his reign, King Zahir Shah 
ruled as well as reigned. One of the most important things 
to happen during the king's next decade of rule was the 
adoption of a new constitution in 1964 (Nyrop 1986, pg. 63). 
The new constitution allowed for greater participation in 
the government by all groups. 
On the first of January in 1965 the People's Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (P.D.P.A.) was founded (Nyrop 1986, pg. 
65). The P.D.P.A. was a Marxist party, although not an 
9rthodox one but one formed of diverse leftist groups. 
Throughout the rest of the decade student unrest continued 
and criticism of the King increased in a number of areas but 
mainly over his refusal to approve legislation already 
passed by the parliament on such issues as the political 
parties bill which allowed opposing political parties (Nyrop 
1986, pg. 67). In 1973, while the King was out of the 
country, Daoud, in a bloodless coup, took over the Afghan 
government with little resistance (Dupree 1980, pg. 753). 
Daoud remained in power until 1978. 
In 1977 the two P.D.P.A. groups, the Khalq and the 
Fareham, rejoined their forces after a ten year split due to 
personality differences of their leaders. They had both 
been continually frustrated in their attempts to be in the 
political mainstream despite the aid of the Fareham party 
and Babrak Karmal in the 1973 coup when Daoud came to power 
(Dupree 1980, pg. 771). 
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In April of 1978, following the murder of Mir Akbar 
Khyber, who was an important member of the Parcham party, 
huge anti-government demonstrations began which resulted in 
the arrest of many P.D.P.A. members. In response, a coup 
lead by the P.D.P.A. and party members in the military 
overthrew and killed President Daoud (Dupree 1980, pg. 771). 
Following the coup, the P.D.P.A., with Taraki as the head, 
assumed leadership of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan. 
The party leaders began a series of reforms which, as 
earlier reforms had done, seriously challenged the existing 
power structures and traditions of the Afghans. The reforms 
included sweeping land reforms, doing away with mortgages, 
and the debts of tenant farmers to landlords, and setting up 
state farms. Unfortunately the land reforms brought little 
relief to the farmer peasants; but what it did do was 
alienate the village leaders, who traditionally relied on 
control of the land for their income and as a means of 
authority and control over the peasants. The other 
offensive reforms initiated by the P.D.P.A. were reforms 
over the marriage practices of the Afghans. A minimum 
marriage age was set and bride prices were limited. These 
were two issues which were of central importance in rural 
society. In response, armed opposition sprang up throughout 
the country. Conflicts continued to exist between the two 
parties in the P.D.P.A., and a purge of Parchamis by the 
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Khalqs took place. The internal situation worsened in 
Afghanistan as the opposition to the government and reforms 
spread throughout most of the country. In September, 1979, 
Hif izullah Amin, the Prime Minister and a Khalq party 
leader, arrested Taraki and threw him in jail where he was 
somehow killed (Dupree 1980, pg. 777). Amin assumed 
control of the party and the state, but he continued to be 
unable to thwart the increasing opposition of the 
mujahideen. The term Mujahideen is an Arabic word meaning 
those who wage a jihad. Jihad is the struggle by Muslims to 
enact the will of God, within oneself and among other people 
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 87). More specific to the Soviet invasion 
and subsequent war, the Afghans saw this as a jihad in that 
they were fighting non-believers who have invaded their 
country and are in opposition to Islam. The Afghans who 
0 
have become communists, as in the P.D.P.A. parties, are even 
more abhorred by the Mujahideen, for they had abandoned 
Islam. 
On December 24, 1979, airborne Soviet troops seized 
Kabul's airport, followed shortly thereafter by mechanized 
ground forces which crossed the border from the north and 
seized Kabul (Dupree 1986, pg. 777). Amin was killed and 
the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as the new president. 
The great game which had continued for centuries with 
Afghanistan walking the tightrope between the various 
superpowers in the region, entered a new chapter. 
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ETHNIC GROUPS 
Afghanistan's ethnicity is overwhelming in its 
diversity and vastness. Ethnicity has played an important 
role in influencing when refugees fled, where they fled to, 
and how they were received, and, depending on the future 
political developments, who will return. 
The Pushtuns are the largest single distinct ethnic 
group in Afghanistan. They numbered about 6.5 million in 
the late 1970's in Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59). One 
important aspect of the Pushtuns is the fact that as a 
people and as an ethnic group they are split down the middle 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another six million 
Pushtuns reside in Pakistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59). The 
Pushtuns have traditionally lived in an area to the east and 
south and southwest of Kabul in Afghanistan and in the 
northwest area of Pakistan. There have at times been calls 
for the formation of a separate country in this area as a 
"Pushtunistan." Because of their ethnic identity and strong 
nationalist tendencies, and geographic proximity to the 
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, the refugees who 
are Pushtuns have predominantly fled to this area. 
The Tajiks number about 3.5 million people (Dupree 
1980, pg. 59). Because the Tajiks are a Persian speaking 
people and live primarily in the northeastern provinces of 
Afghanistan, many Tajiks who fled sought refuge in Iran 
instead of Pakistan. The Tajiks who have fled into Pakistan 
were from Kabul or the eastern provinces (Farr 1988, pg. 
33) . 
The Baluch, who number about 100,000, are mainly 
pastoral nomads who range across the southwest borderlands 
of Afghanistan (Dupree 1980, pg. 59). The Baluchis have 
fled predominantly across the border of southwest Pakistan 
into Baluchistan (Farr 1988, pg. 33). 
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Both the Hazaras and the Aimaqs have remained fairly 
isolated in the central mountainous area of Afghanistan 
during the war and have had much less external dislocation 
as refugees than the other major groups (Farr 1980, pg. 33). 
(See map of ethnic distribution, Figure 2.) 
AFGHAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
The social organization is to a large degree based on 
kinship patterns and genealogy. This reflects the strong 
tribalism of the area. The other type of organization and 
leadership is feudal. Social organization is important to 
note, as for some groups their social organization in 
Afghanistan has been repeated in exile, while others have 
adopted completely new patterns of social organization. 
The tribal pattern is important to consider since more 
than two-thirds of the population base their social 
organization on tribal ties. This proportion is very high 
when compared with the rest of the Middle East. The Pushtun 
refugees from eastern Afghanistan are organized into tribes. 
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The kinship system in tribal groups reflects the relative 
importance of family relationships above all other factors. 
The tribal system in Afghanistan and the patrilineal 
foundation on which it is based are the key to social 
organization. Even though kinship may not be directly 
linked by blood among all tribal members, each individual 
considers himself linked by kinship to the rest of the 
tribe. 
The nomadic tribes are both political units and 
military organizations. The only reason that their autonomy 
exists in most cases is because they have been able to 
defend their autonomy. The tribes are led by a khan. The 
khan is selected by an open acclamation of a tribal jirgah 
(a council). The jirgah is composed of the heads of all the 
various lineages. The khan is usually the eldest son of the 
previous khan as well as being in the senior lineage of the 
tribe. The khan governs the tribe in a manner dictated by 
tribal custom and practice. When issues beyond the scope of 
the khan arise, the jirgah is called in for consultation. 
The status of the tribal members is determined by the 
classical patrilineal model of descent and inheritance 
through the sons. The eldest son replaces the father as 
head of the household and, in theory at least, the other 
sons should pay respect to the eldest son as they would 
their father. Also, as is usually the case in nomadic 
tribal systems, status in the group is based on age and 
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seniority. 
The other major socio-political organization is 
feudalism. This is found in the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, 
and the Pushtuns in southern Afghanistan. The feudal system 
in Afghanistan is based on a landed aristocracy of khans who 
make most of the decisions. 
The traditional tribal leadership has survived the 
transition to refugee camp life. However, the ability of 
the feudal khans to control their followers has waned 
considerably because they have lost their base of authority, 
their land. 
Several new forms of leadership have emerged as a 
result of the current war and refugee situation. One new 
form of leader is the camp leader, or camp "malik." The 
camp maliks derive their power through control over the camp 
rations and the ability to negotiate with the local 
authorities and relief officials, instead of the traditional 
tribal or landlord basis. The other new forms of leadership 
are the resistance party leaders in exile in Pakistan and 
Iran, and the local commanders operating inside Afghanistan. 
THE VILLAGE 
When discussing Afghanistan the village is the next 
social unit to consider. The village is known as the qaryah 
in Dari terms and as the keley in Pushto. The village in 
Afghanistan is usually set up in a nuclear pattern of homes 
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clustered around the town. The village is generally 
considered to be self-sufficient, with most inhabitants 
farming. There are few specialists in the village. The 
leadership is, in many cases, determined by tribal patterns. 
Many of the nomadic peoples spend at least part of the year 
in permanent settlements. Most villages are made up of an 
ethnic group or are very closely related by kinship. 
The village chief is the malik and is picked by the 
villagers themselves. As in the tribal setting, the village 
chief is usually of senior lineage in the village and is 
probably the son of the previous malik. Also, as in the 
tribe, status in the village is first determined by which 
family one belongs to. The only other major consideration 
for status is landholding. 
At the village level, flight was mainly due to 
opposition to communism and to the bombing and fighting 
{Conner 1984, pg. 177). These were issues that were 
collectively felt by the village. Initially the villages 
were untouched by the 1978 coup and later invasions, but as 
the resistance spread out from Kabul they became drawn into 
the conflict. At this level flight was a more collective 
decision and action than in the town or urban areas. 
THE TOWN 
The intermediary between the villages and the urban 
areas are the towns. The town is the lowest commercial 
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community in Afghanistan. People bring their produce from 
the villages to the town by donkey or horse, or by packing 
it on their backs. Once at the town it is then shipped by 
.truck to the cities. Towns usually occur where several 
major roads or trails come together. The local civil 
servants and police are usually headquartered in the town 
and landlords from the surrounding countryside usually live 
there. 
Flight from the towns was similar to that of the 
villages, but in the towns there was greater chance of being 
forced to join the communist party or being arrested or 
conscripted. In the towns there were both group decisions 
to flee later in the conflict as well as the earlier 
decisions which were more individualistic. 
URBAN SOCIETY 
The urban area of Kabul has long been the seat for the 
urban elite which is composed of Pushtun influentials of the 
Duranni lineage, and other Pushtuns of the Mohammadzai line. 
Beneath the elite are intellectuals who live mainly in Kabul 
and are the focus of key positions in government and in 
business. 
For those from urban society, 74% cited fear of 
imprisonment or arrest as a reason for leaving (Conner 1984, 
pg. 177). For those in urban areas the reasons for flight 
and decision to do so were primarily individual matters. 
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{For the location of the provincial capitals, see Figure 3.) 
POWER STRUCTURE 
The Pushtuns consider themselves to be the core 
community of Afghanistan. Until recently Pushtun was 
generally described as being the Afghan tribe, a name that 
was bestowed upon them by early Iranian historians. The 
Pushtuns believe that the country belongs to them more than 
anyone else. In 1747, an Afghan, who was one of the leaders 
of the army of the Persian shah, Nadir, took a group of 
Afghan warriors into Qandahar, following the shah's murder. 
The Afghan, Ahmad Khan, was later elected to Khan by a 
tribal jirgah. Ahmad Khan was the first king of 
Afghanistan. He was a member of the Sandozai clan. After he 
became Khan he took the name of Durr-i-Durran which means, 
"the pearls of pearls" {Smith 1973, pp. 45-46). 
The name of Durrani was later applied to his tribesmen, 
who are still called that to this day. At the time the young 
Khan came into power, he consolidated his power by 
establishing an agreement with the Moharnrnedzai clan. These 
two lineages continue to remain as the royal elites to this 
day. By comparison, the Uzbeks and the Turkomans, even 
though having considerable influence, have power only over 
their own tribes or groups. 
The strength of the Pushtun tribes has insured their 
domination over all other tribes. They make up over half of 
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the population, have supplied the royal family in the past, 
hold most of the cabinet positions, and have wielded 
considerable economic power. The Pushtuns' traditional 
dominance in weaponry has insured their domination over the 
other ethnic groups of the area. 
After the consolidation of the Afghan government, it 
took many years to bring all the other tribes into line. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was an 
ongoing intertribal warfare between the Afghan lords and the 
Hazaras who refused to be brought under the Khans rule. The 
same thing was taking place with the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. 
Besides the Pushtuns, religious leaders have held 
considerable power in Afghanistan both officially and 
unofficially. In the past they were informally associated 
with rulers and leaders and assisted them in maintaining 
control over the people and in interpreting the law. In 
1931 King Nadir Shah founded a body of religious leaders, 
'ulama. This group contained seventeen members, one top 
religious leader from each of the seventeen provinces. The 
duties of the 'ulama, was to advise the government on 
religious issues, control the courts and schools, and pass 
judgment on the practiced public and private norms and 
values. Their political power began to wane with the 
election of Daoud as prime minister in 1953 (Dupree 1980, 
pg. 108). 
The tribal jirgah when done at a national level is 
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referred to as a Loya Jirgah, and is used to garner support 
and gain a consensus. Besides tribal leaders and other 
local elites, religious leaders also sit on the Loya Jirgah 
(Nyrop 1986, pg. 269). With the takeover of the government 
in 1978, by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a 
number of programs and reforms were initiated that were seen 
as anti-Islamic. Even though later attempts were made by 
the POPA to incorporate aspects of Islam and Islamic 
leadership, to gain popular support, the few official 
mullahs, and other religious leaders who expressed support 
for the new regime, were horribly murdered if caught by the 
resistance (Nyrop 1986, pp. 270-271). 
RELIGION 
Almost all the Afghans are Moslems. Islam has both 
general beliefs that can be applied to refugees as well as 
specific beliefs about how to view and treat them. For the 
Afghan refugees, being Moslems and fleeing to Moslem 
countries has had a tremendous impact on how they perceive 
themselves, how others perceive them, and how they are 
treated. 
For the Afghans, their views on Islam have been 
influenced by their customs held even before the advent of 
Islam. Pushtunwali is one such example. Pushtunwali is a 
complex code of honor which dictates behavior on and off the 
battlefield as well as in daily life and even issues of 
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revenge. 
One very important tenet of Islam is the requirement to 
offer sanctuary to the persecuted. This has played an 
important role in the treatment of the Afghan refugees by 
the Pakistanis. The Afghans were constantly offering meals 
and inviting me to stay with the various families in 
Pakistan. When asked why people were so kind, one young man 
replied, "God likes us to help people. I'm doing this to 
make God happy." 
There is also a specific historical situation in Islam 
which defines the Afghan refugee situation in religious 
terms, sanctifies it and obligates the Pakistanis to offer 
sanctuary to their Moslem brothers (Farr 1988, pg. 41). In 
622 A.O., Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, had to flee Mecca 
to Medina, because his preaching in Mecca had embittered the 
town leaders. The flight became known as the "Hejra" (Nyrop 
1986, pg. 88). The Afghan refugees are called the 
Muhajarin, or the people of the Hejra (Farr 1988, pg. 41). 
CHAPTER IV 
THE AFGHAN REFUGEE SITUATION 
With the communist coup and subsequent war in the late 
1970's and 1980's, nearly two-thirds of the estimated 1979 
population of 15.5 million have been uprooted (Nyrop 1986, 
pg. 85). Estimates place the number of internal refugees, 
those still inside Afghanistan, close to two or three 
million (Farr 1988, pg. 5). The majority of the displaced 
Afghans, however, are external refugees, those people who 
have left Afghanistan. According to Iranian Government 
figures, there are 1.9 million Afghans refugees currently 
living in Iran (Nyrop 1986, pg. 85). The majority though 
have fled to Pakistan. 
There are 3.2 million refugees in Pakistan registered 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(U.N.H.C.R.). There are perhaps as many as a quarter 
million that are not registered with the U.N.H.C.R., 
bringing the total population in Pakistan up to 3.5 million 
(Farr 1988, pg. 5). 
AFGHAN REFUGEE FLOWS 
These refugees did not leave Afghanistan all at once. 
There were refugee flows at variable rates which were 
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dependent upon internal events in Afghanistan. Based on the 
work of Kerry Conner (1984), one can identify a number of peak 
refugee flows (traditionally termed vintages) out of 
Afghanistan. Initially there was a very high flow to Pakistan 
in 1978 following the coup. Following the murder of Tariki, 
and later Amin and the arrival of the Soviet troops, in late 
1979 and into early 1980, another large flow departed. 
Between the end of 1980 and early 1981, Conner attributes the 
high flow to several possibilities: internal economic 
problems, military conscription by the Soviet regime, and 
better organization among the resistance commanders. The 
final large peak of refugee outflow in late 1981 and through 
1982, Conner attributes to new conscription programs and 
expanded military offensive (Conner 1984, pp. 173-176). The 
rate of flow was lower in 1983 and stayed constant through 
1984, although it was nowhere near the rate of the first flow 
(Conner 1984, pp. 173-176). After 1985 the flow considerably 
lessened although it never dried up. Following the battle of 
Jalalabad in the summer of 1989 there were an additional 
70,000 refugees who came out through the Khyber Pass into the 
Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan. Many of the refugees 
have been outside their homeland well over a decade now. 
AFGHAN REFUGEE ASSIMILATION 
When a refugee population has been out of its country 
for as long as many of the Afghans have, time becomes a very 
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important factor in terms of being assimilated into the 
local economy. The longer refugees remain in a host 
country, the more they tend to be assimilated into the local 
economy. This has certainly been the case in Pakistan, even 
though the majority of the refugees live in camps set apart 
from the Pakistanis. 
The Afghans have established an economic infrastructure 
both among the refugee population as well as the local 
population. To give a few examples, many of the refugees 
operate street vending businesses which are set up to sell 
food, medicine and other household supplies; others have 
leased store fronts to sell Afghan crafts. Afghan men work 
as tonga (horse cart) drivers, and others who were trained 
M.D.s and lawyers have practices among the local population. 
Practically every occupation from laborers and tailors to 
mechanics and teachers are evident. In other words, the 
refugees are doing much the same type of work as the local 
Pakistanis are doing. However, they aren't necessarily 
displacing the locals (even though that was the local 
perception by the Pakistanis), for much of the Afghans' work 
is providing goods and services to the Afghan refugees 
themselves. 
The refugee camps look permanent. Very few people were 
still living in tents. There were still a number of tents 
evident at many of the camps, but from what can be seen and 
what we were told, most people use the tents now for storage 
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or visitors. In the last decade most refugees have built 
permanent housing out of mud bricks. These houses are 
virtually identical to what the poorer Pakistanis live in. 
The Afghans have been in Pakistan so long in fact that many 
of them have built a number of rooms onto their homes. They 
have built mud walls surrounding their homes, dug wells, put 
in gardens, built awnings and, in some cases, put television 
antennae on their roofs and strung electrical lines to their 
mud homes. 
Cultural assimilation is different from economic 
assimilation or establishing permanent residences. 
Culturally, the Afghans and Pakistanis are very similar in a 
number of areas. Many of the residents of the Northwest 
Frontier Province and the Northeast section of Afghanistan 
are the same ethnic group, Pushtun, and speak the same 
language, Pushto. The ethnic identity of the Pushtun, on 
both sides of the border, is so strong that there have been 
a number of secessionist movements in the past and in the 
present to secede from both countries and establish a 
"Pushtunistan" between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Many of the Afghans are not first time arrivals in 
Pakistan. Many have been migrating back and forth across 
the border for years before the conflict as nomads, traders 
and herders. Some even had relatives or acquaintances in 
Pakistan from before the war. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both Afghans and 
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Pakistanis are Muslims. Being Muslim has many important 
ramifications for this particular situation. Since the 
Afghans are Muslims and fighting "non-believers," this 
struggle has taken on the mantle of being a Jihad or holy 
war. Subsequently this means that the Pakistanis are 
religiously duty bound to provide food and shelter to those 
fighting in the Jihad or fleeing from it. There is also the 
standard duty of the Moslem to provide for the stranger and 
traveller and also the needy. In other words, the Pakistanis 
are doubly induced to help the Afghans. 
One aspect that is in dispute in this situation is the 
matter of economic considerations and how they affect the 
refugee's decision to repatriate. Economic considerations 
have been the key factor and at times the only factor in 
other refugee repatriations. Economic concerns have caused 
many refugee flows initially and have had great impact in 
blocking returnees or encouraging them to stay in a host 
country. There are three major ways that economics affect a 
refugee population. 
The first is the economic situation in the refugee's 
own country. A bad economy in a home country will "push" 
people out. Secondly, a host country with a good economy 
will actually "pull" refugees to it (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-
754). Third, acting as a further "pull" is the 
international community, responding favorably to the 
refugees and providing quite a bit of aid to them. 
Afghanistan continues to have a growing economic crisis 
which pushes the refugees away, pulls them into host 
countries, and keeps them from returning home. 
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The Afghans insist that they don't care about economics 
or money, just about being in their country. Officially the 
government welcomes and aids the refugees, although it is 
also common to be told by officials that they will be glad 
when the refugees go home. The impacts the refugees are 
having on Pakistan include Afghans competing with Pakistanis 
in the local economy, crowding in the cities and surrounding 
areas, and competing over resources such as water, land and 
fire wood. Also there are increasing tensions among the 
various ethnic groups and between Pakistanis and Afghans. 
The Pakistanis, in growing numbers, insist that the Afghans 
are only in Pakistan to sell drugs and weapons. Crime that 
takes place in Peshawar is usually automatically blamed on 
the Afghans by the Pakistanis, whether it's burglaries or 
political murders. The Pakistanis are also resentful of all 
the aid received by the Afghans. In some cases the Afghans 
were better off than the local people, and yet it was the 
Afghans who received aid. These negative views go both 
ways; it is common to hear Afghans speak in disparaging 
terms of the Pakistanis. One scene witnessed in public in 
Peshawar was an Afghan man admonishing a Pakistani woman for 
having a misbehaving child, and the Afghan turning and 
announcing, "These Pakistanis don't know how to raise their 
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children." Despite the close ethnic and religious 
backgrounds of these two groups, there has always existed a 
certain underlying tension. The Pakistanis view the Afghans 
as arrogant, illiterate, mountain nomads. The Afghans view 
the Pakistanis as stupid, docile farmers who live in the 
valleys. Many of the international agencies and workers 
espouse a view somewhere between these. 
Finally, and not least, are human rights and human 
safety concerns. Many observers assumed that the refugees 
would be automatically returned once the Soviets withdrew. 
However, the war continues, first without the Russians, now 
without the communists. 
Even though there are unique characteristics to the 
Afghan refugee situation, not the least the sheer numbers of 
people involved, there are clear indicators from other 
refugee flows and subsequent repatriations, of how certain 
factors affect the refugees' flight, assimilation, and 
possible repatriation. 
AFGHANS IN THE PROCESS MODEL 
The Afghan refugee crisis is rather unique in that all 
four spheres or types of factors mentioned--political, human 
rights, economic and socio-cultural--came into play in 
driving the refugees out of their home country. First in 
the political sphere we have the coup of 1978, and the 
subsequent placement of a communist government in Kabul. 
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This is followed shortly by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. In the next stage, opposition to the 
government and Soviet forces means more battles and more 
governmental retaliation. The army is forcibly conscripting 
youth to serve against the Mujahideen. Refugees flee to 
avoid personal injury to themselves or their children. Many 
flee to avoid Soviet retaliation. The young men flee forced 
conscription, to avoid fighting their own countrymen. 
As the new government continued in power, other changes 
took place on the social and cultural level. The government 
instituted land reforms, passed laws against the customary 
bride fees, and even began schooling of girls. All of these 
changes were culturally quite abhorrent to traditional 
Moslems. 
Finally, with the extensive war, combined with the 
Soviet's "scorched earth" policy, all agriculture came 
grinding to a halt. Many of the irrigation ditches and 
tunnels were blown up or filled with silt. Roads were 
destroyed, and many economic areas, such as markets, were 
deserted. 
When the Afghans fled, they went to a country that ·was 
politically supportive of the cause of the Afghans in 
opposing the Soviets and communist government in Kabul. The 
Pakistanis also directly supported the Afghans in their 
struggle by providing weapons and training, and allowing the 
transit of weapons from other countries. 
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In the human rights sphere, the Pakistanis provided 
aid, food, protection, and shelter and opposed attempts by 
the Afghan army to come into Pakistan after the rebels. At 
the same time, Pakistan also exhibited strong positive 
"pulls" in the socio-cultural sphere. For example, many of 
the Pakistanis and Afghans have similar ethnic backgrounds. 
In the N.W.F.P., all are Pushtun. In many cases they speak 
common or similar languages. Many of the refugees have been 
coming and going across the border for years as traders and 
nomads. 
And the most important factor of all, they are all 
Moslems. The Islamic creed demands that sanctuary be given 
to those in need. Additionally they are both fighting what 
they perceive as a common enemy to the Islamic way of life, 
communism. 
And finally, the Pakistanis have provided for the 
Afghans economically, both directly with aid, food, shelter, 
and medicine, as well as indirectly by allowing some 
penetration into the Pakistan economy. There have been some 
workshops set up for rug weaving and ethnic art work, as 
well the Afghan trucking industry which has sprung up to 
supply transport for poor Pakistanis. All these factors 
still exist, holding the Afghans in Pakistan. 
So what needs to be considered is this: would 
reasonable persons (refugees) decide to leave a country of 
long standing refuge, where the government sides with them 
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politically, sees that they are protected and safe, supports 
them and allows them to make a living, where the local 
people are similar in manner and custom and religion, and 
return to a country in a civil war, to face personal danger, 
ethnic strife, and economic destitution? Is this a 
reasonable exchange? Or will forced repatriation be 
necessary? 
In the Afghan refugees' situation, all the positive 
factors drawing the Afghans to Pakistan are intact. All the 
negative factors pushing the Afghans out of their country 
are constantly changing. However, the final outcome still 
is unknown. With the Soviet troop withdrawal and removal of 
the Kabul government, civil war may still embroil the 
country as various groups vie for power in the new 
government. If a civil war takes place among the various 
factions, the civilian population will be enmeshed in it due 
to the very nature of the Afghans' guerrilla tactics. The 
Afghans have always been heavily dependent on local 
population support. Any civil war in Afghanistan will 
certainly involve a substantial portion of the population. 
Not only will the civilians be in the middle of a civil war; 
they will probably be targeted as logistical support by the 
opposing factions. 
The groups that are currently vying for power have a 
number of platforms, some calling for Islamic fundamentalist 
reform, others a return of the former king, and of course 
the Russians hope for a pro-Moscow government in Kabul. 
There is no doubt that, whatever faction or coalition of 
factions gains power, some group will be opposed to it for 
political, religious, or ethnic reasons. There is every 
reason to believe that the civil war will break out along 
ethnic or religious lines. 
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Finally we must consider that the country is devastated 
economically. Huge amounts in aid and extensive local 
efforts will be required to rebuild the country. If the 
government is under siege or there is no government 
infrastructure, there will not be a functioning economy as 
well. If large parts of the population are fleeing a civil 
war there will certainly be no rebuilding taking place. 
With a fleeing population there will be no redevelopment of 
agriculture, even direct aid distribution to the returnees 
will be difficult. What can be done then? Should all aid 
and support be cut off from the Afghans in Pakistan, forcing 
them home? While appearing as a solution it can only be a 
temporary one at best. As we know from other forced 
repatriations, they are painful at best, deadly at the 
worst. 
The most important factor to deal with in Afghanistan 
is its political crisis, followed by the economic crisis. 
Afghanistan needs a stable government and an economic base 
to build from, before one can reasonably expect the refugees 
to return home. 
CHAPTER V 
METHODS 
Data for this thesis were collected through one hundred 
interviews conducted in Pakistan during the Fall of 1988. 
The interviews provided data regarding the background of the 
refugees, their previous condition in Afghanistan and their 
life in Pakistan. Besides the direct responses to the 
questions (such as yes or no, or other answers that have 
been categorized in the following data sections) all answers 
and comments made during the interviews were taken down word 
for word as they were given in English by the respondent or 
as they were translated by my guides. Some of the open 
ended responses were quite lengthy and very rich in detail. 
As an illustration, when asked why they left, a common 
answer was, "Because of the Russians", the respondents would 
then go on and give several pages of in-depth explanation 
about why they left because of the Russians. While those 
data do not lend themselves well to statistical analysis, 
they give a great deal of insight into the motivations, 
feelings and perceptions of the Afghan respondents. These 
open-ended responses will be used when applicable to try to 
understand the refugees' perspective in a fuller social 
context, and where possible identify the difference between 
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the "expected" answer and how the respondents really felt. 
Besides the interview data, field notes were made following 
each batch·of interviews and of any situation or observation 
relating to the Afghan refugee situation. Also, notes were 
kept of interviews and conversations with refugee aid 
workers, Pakistani officials, U.N.H.C.R. workers, and 
anthropologists and journalists who were in Peshawar and 
Quetta at the time. This information will be used, when 
applicable, to try to more fully understand the Afghan 
refugee situation and the responses of the refugee 
respondents. Data were collected in both Baluchistan and 
the North West Frontier Province so as to get a more 
representative sample of Afghans, although the Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan are primarily from the border 
provinces. 
The population that was studied was a small segment of 
the 3.5 million Afghans currently in refuge in Pakistan. 
Due to the great mobility of the Afghan refugee population 
in Pakistan and the fact that so many refugees are not 
registered with the various refugee agencies, or are double 
registered in different camps, or are registered in camps 
and then have gone back across the border to continue 
fighting in the Jihad (as well as my own monetary, time and 
political restraints), it was not feasible or possible to 
choose a random sample. Instead, I used Afghans as guides 
and requested them to take me to many different refugee 
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camps in the areas around Peshawar and Quetta, in order to 
get as wide a range of subjects as possible. Overall, 
sixteen different camps were visited. The respondents were 
selected on the basis of availability; some knew the guides, 
most did not. If the guide knew someone in the camp, we 
would go to his hut and ask him to send sons or friends off 
to collect those willing to be interviewed. People were 
also stopped in the streets and asked to be interviewed. We 
did this if the guide did not know anyone in the camp. 
Never in my presence did anyone refuse to be interviewed; 
most were very willing. 
To work with as wide a range of subjects as possible, 
if one person from a specific family was interviewed, we 
would not interview others from that same family. Also, if 
we interviewed several people from one village in 
Afghanistan, we then moved on, trying to talk with people 
from many different areas. If we interviewed several older 
men, we would ask for some young men and vice versa. The 
same procedures were followed for the educated or uneducated 
and professions, such as farmer versus teacher or resistance 
leader versus follower. Once the respondent was selected, 
the guide and I would explain the nature of the research 
project and who I was. The respondents were not paid for 
their time. 
Of the three different Afghan guides with whom I 
worked, the first I met in Portland, the second was arranged 
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by the Belgium s.o.s. Center (a refugee aid group) in 
Peshawar, and the third guide was arranged through the Save 
the Children Federation (a refugee aid group) in Quetta. 
The guides were paid for their time and chosen on the basis 
of their fluency in English (all were very fluent) and their 
knowledge of the surrounding camps. I spent several hours 
with each of the guides before the interviews explaining the 
project and the nature of each question. I stressed the 
importance of asking the questions of each respondent in the 
same way, without leading any of the subjects. The few 
times I was not able to work with the guides, I went to 
various sections of Peshawar and Quetta that had Afghan 
shops and merchants and requested to interview them. I 
deliberately turned down an off er from the Peshawar minister 
of refugees for his office to provide me with a guide, as 
well as turning down offers from two resistance leaders, one 
in Peshawar and one in Quetta, to provide me with guides. I 
did this because I had been warned that they would only take 
me to those whom they wanted me to interview. 
Approximately half the refugees spoke little or no 
English, and the guides acted as translators. Those that 
did speak English I interviewed directly. Of the refugees 
that spoke no English, I was able to verify the yes and no 
responses to questions, where they were from and how many 
children they had and other short answers, as I had studied 
Pushtun and spoke it a little. During the interviews, the 
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questions were asked off a typed interview sheet, and all 
refugees were asked the same questions in the same order and 
same manner, except for the first ten respondents which I 
used as a sample survey. These first ten respondents 
suggested an additional twelve questions, which were asked 
of all the following subjects. 
During the interviews, responses were recorded in 
writing in English, by myself, as they were given, either 
directly or through the translation of my guides. 
Despite the problems of conducting this survey in 
difficult conditions, such as language barriers, it is 
believed that the research represents reliable data given 
the situation. 
PROBLEMS IN THE METHODOLOGY 
Qualifiers 
1. I attempted to conduct the interviews anonymously, 
but most of the Afghans kept insisting on telling me their 
names. So I took all of their names in order to remain 
consistent. However, I have been careful not to use any of 
the names in the reporting of the data, nor have I ever 
listed the names with any of the data being analyzed. 
2. The question of age is an interesting one for the 
Afghans. You are either a young man, a middle aged man, or 
an old man. Some people honestly admitted that they did not 
know their exact chronological age. I was told later by 
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Sar-Baz that, in general, Afghans do not keep track of their 
birthdays. Based on the conversations with the respondents 
about two-thirds knew when they were born. If people were 
not sure I asked them to make the best guess they could. 
3. Enquiring about ethnic group or tribe resulted in 
mainly a Pushtun response, but there were also some Tajiks 
and an occasional Dari speaker. Some responses though were 
simply, "I'm Afghan" (which generally means Pushtun). 
4. The marital status question was interesting in that 
people would give me shocked looks if they had children 
themselves, and answer, "Why of course I'm married". In 
general, if the men were old enough to be married they were. 
5. Questions about the number of children in each 
family and their ages evoked differing responses. Children 
are the Afghans' great pride and joy. They love to show 
them off, especially their sons, as in the case of the 
little boy who was presented to me to sing the song about 
"death to the Russians." Other men were interviewed while 
holding little squirming two or three year old daughters in 
their arms, yet they wouldn't admit to having girl children. 
They would say "Yes I have two children, .. oh, and one 
daughter." Also, many of them weren't sure about the ages 
of their children and would reply "Oh, .. he is two or maybe 
three." I made it a point to ask people how many sons and 
daughters they had. As far as children's ages, I asked 
parents to give me a specific age or their best guess. 
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6. Answers to the questions about home town revealed 
that many people lived in rural communities and would give 
the name of the nearest big town and the province they lived 
in. In the analysis of the data, province was used to 
determine geographic location (except for those who said 
they were from Kabul) . 
7. The years of education question revealed that many 
people were literate who had never been to school. Many 
were self taught, or had gone to the mosques where they had 
been helped by imans or other learned men who would go to 
the mosque to help those who wanted to learn. I was told 
that this was'customary in Afghanistan as a way for people 
to learn. The three levels of education seen among the 
respondents were: formally educated at a school; informally 
educated, at a mosque; and illiterates with no education. 
8. When asked the reasons for leaving Afghanistan, 
some responded "because of the communists," others "because 
of the Soviets;" some gave the reason as the war, others say 
all of these. The answers given were difficult to analyze 
since some were so short yet were meant as a global 
response, others were so lengthy and had so much detail that 
they fit into all of the categories. 
9. The respondents were asked, "When did you leave?" 
Most answers were straight forward, although a couple of 
people stated they had never left their country, that they 
were just "visiting" in Pakistan before returning home. 
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Others said they left then went back several times. When 
people said they left and reestablished their home and 
family in Pakistan was the answer I used for when they fled. 
10. People were asked where they lived in Pakistan. 
Some lived in camps, others lived in camps that were really 
spontaneous settlements. Others, especially the well off, do 
not stay in the camps, but are merely registered in the 
camps and in fact live in town or in the nearest city. 
11. People were asked, "Do you work here in Pakistan?" 
Many had regular jobs such as drivers or merchants. Others 
had apprentice positions such as tailors or masons through 
the local VOLAGS, such as the Belgium center. Others said no 
they had no job except living or that their job was the 
jihad and helping the Mujahideen. 
12. Respondents were asked, "What was your job in 
Afghanistan?" This seemed rather straightforward, once they 
understood that it was their occupation before the war that 
I was interested in. What surprised me is the huge number 
of young men who had been students in their early teens or 
younger, and only Mujahideen since. It raised the same 
concerns for myself that others have noted: that this is a 
whole generation of young men who know nothing except 
fighting in a war. 
13. The respondents were asked, "Is your family here?" 
This was fairly straightforward. For the majority of men, 
it was a foregone conclusion. Because if they had come out 
of Afghanistan due to heavy fighting, it was almost a sure 
bet that they had brought out their families long before. 
75 
Of course some of their families had been killed and a few 
still had relatives inside. Then there is the question of 
what is family. For the Afghans, it is considered in its 
extended form. For some, family includes cousins, aunts, 
uncles, siblings, and in-laws, besides the regular 
accompaniment of what we would consider families of fathers, 
mothers and direct children. 
14. "Will you return before the Soviet's withdrawal?" 
This and subsequent questions which I see as being 
"repatriation" questions seemed to be the most difficult in 
that the Afghans see these in a very mono-ideological way. 
What I mean by this is that when I would ask this and other 
repatriation questions, I would get a comprehensive response 
which usually included most of the following ideological 
components: "I'll return when the communist repression ends, 
the puppet government falls, there is Islamic rule, and we 
can live in peace." It was difficult to separate out the 
various issues. I would ask, "Well, what about just the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces?", and I would receive the whole 
response once again. Basically, though, most responded 
that, "Yes, the withdrawal of Soviet forces was the most 
important issue of all." If the respondents would not give 
me a direct answer I would repeat the specific question 
until I would get an answer specific to it. 
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15. The respondents were asked, "Will you return to 
Afghanistan if the Mujahideen and the other parties are 
fighting for power?" Besides the problem noted above, this 
question was interesting in that many people refused to 
admit that this could happen. On the one hand, I think a 
lot of people had been told by their leaders that this would 
not happen; and, on the other hand, I think they might have 
been a little miffed about the way the western press treated 
the issue - which was that as soon as the Soviets left, a 
huge civil war would break out among all the groups trying 
to gain control of the country. However, these people had 
all been fighting together and cooperating. I think many 
actually believed that after being in the jihad together 
that they had a bond that superseded any previous rivalries 
or jealousies. 
16. one of the biggest limitations in this research 
project revolves around the relation between what 
respondents say they will do, and what they are actually 
likely to do in the future. One of the intentions of this 
project was to be able to predict refugee flows and possible 
repatriation based on the responses given by the Afghan 
subjects who were interviewed. Because the data were 
collected at a time now over three years before any large 
scale repatriation was even possible, time has become an 
intervening variable impacting beliefs and possible future 
actions. As Herbert Blumer noted in his work in 1948, 
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"Public opinion must obviously be recognized as having its 
setting in a society and as being a function of that society 
in operation. The formation of public opinion occurs 
through the interaction of groups" (Blumer 1948, pp. 543-
544). The point Blumer was making was that opinion is not 
just the sum of individual beliefs. As he notes, "Public 
opinion does not occur through an interaction of disparate 
individuals who share equally in the process." (Ibid, pg. 
544) More specific to the Afghan situation and this 
research is the relation between intention and behavior. As 
Fishbein and Azjen noted in their work, Belief, Attitude, 
Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and 
Research {1975), the best way to predict a people's behavior 
is to ask them if they are going to perform that behavior. 
Fishbein and Azjen believed that there was a high 
correlation between intention to perform a particular 
behavior and a person's actually performing that behavior. 
However, they go on to qualify this by noting, "The longer 
the time interval between measurement of intention and 
observation of behavior, the greater the probability that 
the individual may obtain new information or that certain 
events will occur which will change his intention ... The 
greater the number of intervening steps, the lower the 
intention behavior correlation will be" (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975, pp. 369-370). All three of these authors' work has 
important implications for this research. The Afghans are 
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ideologically oriented, and very much collectively so. 
While they had pragmatic objections to the Soviets and 
communists they were also wrapped in an 
ideological/emotional blanket. Their stated intentions 
bordered on attitudes and opinions, in sense that their 
responses were probably closer to Blumer's opinions than to 
Fishbein and Ajzen's intentions. Despite my efforts, it was 
very difficult to interview people in private. Often their 
relatives and neighbors wanted to be present. Even when I 
would have the observers leave, they would hang around 
outside and peer in the doors or windows, putting latent 
pressure on the respondent to give the correct collective 
answer. Approximately half the interviews were done with 
others present. As noted previously the Afghans are to a 
large degree tribal and they rely on tribal leadership. 
According to current contacts I have in Pakistan, even with 
recent developments, the leaders are discouraging wide scale 
return currently. 
As far as behavioral intentions at the time of the 
interviews (1988), the respondents did not appear to really 
know what would be happening in the future. When they were 
asked to give specific times of when an event might occur 
(such as repatriation), they would say "Only Allah knows." 
It was assumed that the Kabul government would collapse with 
the withdrawal of the Soviets in the Spring of 1989. Many 
refugees felt there would not be fighting among the parties 
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once the communists were removed. When the refugees were 
asked when they would return only six percent gave an actual 
time, the rest said either, "When Allah wishes," or they 
gave a list of preconditions. What this illustrates is 
that, despite what they said, the relation between their 
intentions and possible repatriation behavior is a very 
complex one. This relation is certainly heavily impacted by 
the time interval and intervening steps, as noted by 
Fishbein and Ajzen, as well as the issue Blumer raised of 
the relationship between individual opinion and collective 
belief. 
17. Another important consideration is that the number 
of cases as well as the type of sample do not allow for a 
multivariate statistical analysis. In the following data 
presentation and analysis, I do not attempt to control for 
intervening variables or do multivariate analysis. I will 
examine the relations between pairs of variables in the form 
of cross tabulations. I must also acknowledge that not 
enough questions were asked about the actual decision-making 
process by which the refugees left Afghanistan or the 
process by which they will decide to repatriate. Even 
though the respondents were asked as individuals, they 
certainly will rely to a great extent on their leadership in 
the decision making process. One must also recognize that 
the decision to return and when to return will not be left 
solely to the Afghans but will be impacted, if not 
manipulated, by foreign governments, relief agencies, and 
Pakistan. 
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These qualifiers do not mean that the view and 
intentions of the refugees based on their answers in 1988 
will be unimportant. However, I do not intend to present 
these findings as the sole predictor of repatriation 
behavior that may take place in the future. Instead, I 
present these data as part of what will be a very complex 
process and in all probability will take years to resolve. 
Based on past refugee flows and repatriation, the Afghan 
situation will probably never be completely resolved. I 
believe that the orientations and answers given by the 
refugees I interviewed will be part of this complex process, 
and I present the data and conclusions in that context. 
CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS 
The questions and findings are broken down into three 
major areas. The first is basic demographics. The second 
is intervening variables, such as how much aid have you 
received from Pakistan (these are headed with IN). Third are 
issues directly affecting repatriation (these are headed 
with RP). Since there were 100 subjects, in all of the 
basic findings presented below the percent is the same as 
actual number of respondents. For example, 50 percent is 
equal to an N of 50. 
Of the 100 subjects interviewed, the ages ranged from 
15 to 70 years, with a mean of 35.85 and a mode of 30. 
Of the respondents, 50 percent were 31 years old or 
less. This is a characteristic grouping of agriculturalists 
living in a non-industrialized society. (See Table I.) 
The respondents were primarily Pushtun speakers, 
totaling 83 percent. Tajik speakers made up 13 percent of 
the group, and four percent were other. (See Table II.) 
Of the refugees interviewed, 76 percent were married, 
20 percent were single, and four percent widowed. (See Table 
III.) Virtually all people of marrying age were either 
married or widowed. My refugee assistant claimed that 
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TABLE I 
AGE 
Category Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
15-24 yrs. 21 21. 0 21.0 
25-34 yrs. 32 32.0 53.0 
35-44 yrs. 20 20.0 73.0 
45-54 yrs. 14 14.0 87.0 
55-64 yrs. 8 8.0 95.0 
65-70 yrs. 5 5.0 100.0 
--
Total 100 100.0 
TABLE II 
ETHNIC GROUP 
Category Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
Push tun 83 83.0 83.0 
Dari 1 1. 0 84.0 
Tajik 13 13.0 97.0 
Uzbek 1 1. 0 98.0 
Baluch 1 1. 0 99.0 
Turkoman 1 1. 0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
TABLE III 
MARITAL STATUS 
Category Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
Single 20 20.0 20.0 
Married 76 76.0 96.0 
Widowed 4 4.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
Afghans never divorced because no one would want to marry 
someone who has been divorced. Nor would they let their 
sister or daughter marry a man who has divorced. 
The respondents with children were 74 percent of the 
group and they were all married. In fact most of the 
refugees were surprised to be asked if they had children. 
The typical response was, "Why of course I have children; 
I'm married." 
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At the same time unmarried subjects expressed surprise 
at being asked if they had children. Of the respondents, 26 
percent had no children. Of those with children, 55 percent 
of the total sample had three or more children and 19 
percent had seven or more. (See Table IV.) 
In questioning further about their children, 50 percent 
of the sample had children who were five years old or less 
and 67 percent had children who were 14 years or less. (See 
Table V.) While the large numbers of children are a 
characteristic of non-industrialized societies, I was also 
informed by a number of Afghans that Allah and Islam wanted 
them to have lots of children. I was even admonished for 
being married and not having children yet. I was scolded, 
"If you Americans weren't so greedy for your cars and 
television sets, you could then afford to have lots of 
children." 
The respondents were primarily men, 96 percent. Only 
four women were interviewed due to the cultural restrictions 
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TABLE IV 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
Number Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
None 26 26.0 26.0 
One 9 9.0 35.0 
Two 10 10.0 45.0 
Three 6 6.0 51.0 
Four 11 11. 0 62.0 
Five 10 10.0 72.0 
Six 9 9.0 81.0 
Seven + 19 19.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
TABLE V 
AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD 
Age Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Category Percent 
None 26 26.0 26.0 
Under Five 50 50.0 76.0 
6-10 11 11. 0 87.0 
11-14 6 6.0 93.0 
15-18 2 2.0 95.0 
19-22 4 4.0 99.0 
23 + 1 1. 0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
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on the interactions between men and women. I felt that even 
though the number of women interviewed were limited that 
they might off er some possible insights on potential 
differences. The women that were interviewed showed no 
consistent differences in their responses from those of the 
men. 
Eight percent of the interviewees claimed to be party 
leaders or tribal leaders and six percent were visibly 
wounded or crippled due to involvement in the war. 
When asked where their homes were, 11 different 
provinces were listed by the respondents. The largest group 
by far, 45 percent, were from the Ningrahar province. The 
next largest group, 22 percent, were from Kabul. (See map on 
Origin of Refugee Respondents, and see Table VI.) 
When asked about their educational background, there 
was a wide disparity in levels of education. Thirty eight 
percent of the subjects had no formal education (See Table 
VII.) 
For the Afghans, there are two types of educations that 
are utilized. The first is the standard education of 
schools, textbooks and hired teachers teaching a standard 
educational curriculum. The second type of education is 
going to the local mosque and being taught to read the Koran 
by the local Mullah. I was informed that if someone wanted 
to learn to read and write he or she would go to the mosque 
and ask for help, and either the Mullah or some other 
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TABLE VI 
PROVINCE FROM 
Province Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
Jowzjan 1 1. 0 1.0 
Kabul 22 22~0 23.0 
Ningrahar 45 45.0 68.0 
Qandahar 8 8.0 76.0 
Helmand 2 2.0 78.0 
Uruzgan 1 1. 0 79.0 
Kunduz 3 3.0 82.0 
Laghman 6 6.0 88.0 
Logar 9 9.0 97.0 
Paktia 2 2.0 99.0 
Kapisa 1 1. 0 100.0 
--
Total 100 100.0 
TABLE VII 
YEARS OF EDUCATION 
Years Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
None 38 38.0 38.0 
3-5 3 3.0 41.0 
6-8 8 8.0 49.0 
9-12 32 32.0 81. 0 
13-15 + 19 19.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
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learned man would teach those wanting it. Sometimes they 
were taught to read just the Koran, but sometimes they would 
practice reading other things as well. 
When the refugees were asked why they originally left 
Afghanistan, 28 percent answered simply, "Because of the 
Russians." Twenty-one percent said, "Because of communism 
and its opposition to Islam." Twenty percent said, "Because 
of invasion and the war." And 24 percent said, "Because of 
fighting and the attacks." Of the subjects, four percent 
claimed to have left because they had either been put in 
jail or were threatened with being jailed. (See Table VIII.) 
Another way to consider these statistics is that almost 
half, 49 percent, left for what seemed to be a combination 
of safety concerns and ideological reasons. While I had 
hoped to have clear answers distinguishing safety versus 
ideological reasons, what became obvious after conducting 
the interviews (and based on my observations and field 
notes) was that for some the Russians were synonymous with 
fears about safety, as they were identified as the source of 
the bombing and fighting, while others were ideologically 
opposed to the Russians due to communism's opposition to 
Islam. In future research of this type, questions 
concerning a foreign occupying force should be broken down 
into sub-categories of fear for personal safety and 
ideological opposition. Forty-four percent would appear to 
be obvious safety concerns of invasion, war, fighting, and 
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attacks. Unlike other refugee populations around the world, 
not a single refugee subject mentioned fleeing his or her 
home country for economic considerations. In sharp 
contrast, based on my field notes and interviews and 
conversations with Pakistanis, the Pakistanis' general 
belief is that in fact the Afghans are there for economic 
reasons. 
The subjects who were interviewed had left their homes 
in Afghanistan anywhere from one year up to ten years before 
these interviews took place. Thirty percent of the 
subjects had been refugees for nine to ten years and 74 
percent had been refugees for five years or more. The fact 
that such a large population of people have been refugees 
for so long causes concern since it appears that the longer 
refugees remain out of their home country, the less is their 
likelihood return. (See Table IX.) 
Seventy-five percent of the 100 refugees interviewed 
were scattered among the 16 refugee camps within Pakistan; 
the remaining 25 percent resided in Jamrud tribal area (also 
in Pakistan), or in the cities of Peshawar or Quetta or in 
the town of Hyadabad. 
When asked what their jobs were in Pakistan, 22 percent 
said they had none. Eight percent listed themselves as 
leaders, 12 percent were teachers and 48 percent claimed 
their job as the Jihad; the remainder fell into other 
categories with less than three respondents each. 
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TABLE VIII 
REASONS FOR LEAVING 
Reasons Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Given Percent 
Russians 28 28 ~.o 28.0 
Invasion/War 20 20.0 48.0 
Fighting/Attacks 24 24.0 72.0 
Communism/ 21 21.0 93.0 
Islam Opposition 
Revolution 1 1.0 94.0 
Jail/Threatened 4 4.0 98.0 
Other 2 2.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 
TABLE IX 
WHEN DID YOU LEAVE HOME 
Years Frequency Percent CUmulative 
Percent 
Year or less 4 4.0 4.0 
1-2 yrs. 6 6.0 10.0 
3-4 yrs. 16 16.0 26.0 
5-6 yrs. 21 21.0 47.0 
7-8 yrs. 23 23.0 70.0 
9-10 yrs. 30 30.0 100.0 
--
Total 100 100.0 
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When asked what their occupations were in Afghanistan, 
23 percent reported being farmers, 24 percent were students, 
10 percent were teachers, seven percent were merchants, five 
percent were clerks, five percent claimed to be leaders, and 
22 percent were scattered among several occupations. 
One important consideration affecting repatriation is 
whether or not a refugee leaves his family behind or takes 
them into refuge as well. Of the people interviewed, 95 
percent had their families with them in Pakistan, only one 
percent had part of his family in Pakistan and only four 
percent did not have their families with them. 
When asked which party the subject belonged to, 20 
percent, the largest group, were members of the Hezb-I-
Islami party run by Moli Halis. Seventeen percent were 
members of the party run by Gulbiden Hekmatyer. Another 17 
percent were members of the Mohaz-A-Mili, and 14 percent 
belonged to the Jamiat Islami. The remainder were 
distributed among the three other major parties and the five 
minor splinter parties. Contrary to the perception that 
party membership is an important part of Afghan life, the 
Afghans interviewed seemed not to have a great deal of 
concern with regard to which party they belonged. Many 
explained that they had simply joined the party that was in 
charge of which ever camp they had settled into or which 
their relatives belonged to. 
When asked which party should govern in the new Afghan 
92 
government, 34 percent said, "Any Islamic party as long as 
it is Islamic." Twenty-five percent said "Any party," nine 
percent said, "All of them should govern," and eight percent 
said "None are able to." Only eight percent of the refugees 
stated that, "The party they belonged to should run the new 
government in Afghanistan." I think these answers are 
significant to note in that they illustrate the difference 
between the western press and leaders' perceptions of party 
importance and what the refugees were willing to say. 
IN) When the refugees were asked how important 
religious freedom was to them, on a scale of the most 
important factor to not a very important factor, 22 percent 
said it was the most important, 58 percent said it was very 
important, 13 percent said it was important, and three 
percent said not as important as other factors. 
For the Afghans the term "religious freedom" meant 
freedom to practice Islam, not freedom to practice any 
religion. 
IN) When asked what help they have received from 
Pakistan, 41 percent answered, "They gave us shelter." 
"Shelter, aid, and food were given," claimed 18 percent, and 
10 percent replied, "They gave us wheat or food." Often, 
after the initial answer, the Afghans would add that in fact 
the Pakistanis stole much of the international aid and 
relief supplies for their own use. I believe that this 
illustrates some of the underlying tensions and distrust 
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that existed between the Afghans and their Pakistani hosts. 
When asked if they expected more help from the 
Pakistanis after they returned home, 28 percent said, "Yes," 
21 percent did not know, 14 percent said, "Maybe," 13 
percent said, "Hopefully," and seven percent answered, "No." 
The rest answered in other categories. 
The refugees were asked if they thought the Pakistanis 
would ever force them to leave. Fifty-two percent answered, 
"No." Only six percent answered, "Yes." Eleven percent 
said, "It depends on the future government," nine percent 
said, "Maybe," and the rest did not answer or did not know. 
RP) Another aspect the refugees were questioned on was 
their perception of what would be needed when they returned. 
The largest category, 42 percent, gave a long list of 
necessities including money, tents, food, tractors, building 
materials, and agricultural materials. The next largest 
group, 32 percent, answered, "We need everything." Ten 
percent of the subjects listed immediate needs such as 
housewares, utensils, food and clothing. And finally, nine 
percent said, "We need cash." 
Essentially, 74 percent indicated that they recognize 
that they will need almost everything when they return. 
RP) The refugees were asked what they planned on 
taking back with them when they return. Forty percent said, 
"Everything I have." A surprising 27 percent said, " We 
have nothing to take." This I can verify. The people I 
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visited and especially those with whom I stayed had nothing 
but their string beds, a few clothes and some cooking pots 
and cooking utensils. Seventeen percent said they would 
take "Clothes, baggages and beds." 
RP) When asked how the refugees would rebuild their 
war destroyed homes, 30 percent answered, "International 
aid." Twenty one percent said, "Cash," 19 percent said, 
"Work and aid." Twelve percent answered with, "Hard work," 
and eleven percent were hopeful of the United Nations. The 
refugees were then asked what work they would do when they 
went home. Twenty-four percent said they would be farmers, 
16 percent said they would work for the government or the 
army, 11 percent said they would be students, and five 
percent claimed they were too old to work. Twenty-five 
percent listed other occupations. 
RP) With the concerns over possible violence, the 
refugees were asked if there would be a problem with bandits 
or fighting with all the heavily armed Afghans. Thirty 
percent thought there would be such a problem. Twenty-three 
percent said, "No problems," while thirty three percent 
claimed, "If there is an Islamic government, there will be 
no fighting." 
RP) Tribal ties are an important consideration for the 
Afghans. When asked if their whole tribe would return as a 
group, eighty percent said, "Yes." Fourteen percent said, 
"No, we would go individually." 
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When asked who would make the decision when it was time 
to go back, 48 percent said, "The leader of the tribe." 
Fourteen percent claimed they would decide individually, and 
fourteen percent said, "The parties would decide." 
RP) When the refugees were asked how they would return 
to Afghanistan, 19 percent said they had walked to Pakistan 
and they would walk back to Afghanistan. Thirty-five 
percent said they would go by truck or bus, if they got 
help, and by foot if not. Eighteen percent said that they 
would return by bus or truck. Twenty-two percent said that 
they would return in any way, that how was not important. 
This is not a naive answer as it first might appear. 
Conversations with several journalists and aid workers who 
had been inside Afghanistan with the Mujahideen, verified 
that most transportation was by foot. At times hundreds of 
miles were covered on foot depending on where groups were 
heading. 
RP) In trying to determine which refugees would remain 
in Pakistan, the subjects were asked if they thought the 
rich Afghans would stay in Pakistan? sixty-six percent 
said, "No." Thirteen percent said, "Maybe," and nine 
percent said, "Yes." At the same time, the subjects were 
asked if they thought the students in the universities in 
Pakistan would finish their education before they returned. 
Fifty one percent said, "No, they would not finish their 
education. They would return as soon as possible." Twenty 
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seven percent said, "Yes, the students would stay and finish 
their educations," or that, "They should stay for the good 
of Afghanistan." And eleven percent said, "Maybe," or "It 
depends on the students." 
The refugees were then asked if they knew anyone 
personally who would stay in Pakistan? Eighty-two percent 
said, "No," and six percent said, "Yes." 
One respondent took me aside after a series of 
interviews with other refugees and explained in private that 
in fact many refugees would not return home, due to tribal 
rivalries or feuds, or because they had established their 
business in Pakistan, but that it was not safe to 
acknowledge this fact because everyone was expected to 
return to their homeland. 
Finally, the subjects were asked if someone stays, will 
their family stay with them? Fifty-two percent said, "Yes," 
while 22 percent said, "No." Sixteen percent said "Maybe," 
or "It depends on them." 
RP) In trying to determine certain factors that could 
either block or encourage repatriation, the refugees were 
asked a series of questions about whether they thought they 
would return under certain situations. The first of these 
questions was, "Will you return before the Russians leave 
Afghanistan?" An overwhelmingly ninety-nine percent said 
they would not. Only one of the subjects said he would 
return before the Russians left but this was only so he 
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could continue to fight the Russians. 
When asked if the refugees would return if the parties 
or Mujahideen were fighting for power among themselves, 
sixty percent said, "No" and twenty percent said, "Yes, they 
would go back to try and stop the fighting." Eighteen 
percent insisted that the Mujahideen and parties would not 
fight among themselves as long as there was an Islamic 
government. Many Afghans have been seriously injured by 
anti-personnel mines planted in Afghanistan. When asked if 
they would return before the mines were removed, 65 percent 
said they would not, while 32 percent said they would go 
back, that it was their duty to help remove the mines. 
Three percent said, "Maybe," or that they would prefer that 
they were removed. 
RP) When considering the make up of the future 
government of Afghanistan, the refugees were queried on 
whether or not they would return if there was not an Islamic 
government. Ninety-five percent said that they would not 
return if there was not an Islamic government. This 
question, when asked, seemed to invoke surprise among the 
subjects. Many would look at me as though I were a somewhat 
"backward child" and patiently explain to me in such terms 
as, "The whole reason that we are fighting the war is 
because we do not have an Islamic government." 
Only one person out of the 100 subjects said that he 
would return if there was not an Islamic government. 
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RP) The refugees were also asked if they would return 
if King Zahir Shah returned from exile and governed 
Afghanistan. Forty-four percent of the refugees claimed 
they would not. Many even said they would fight against him 
if he did return; it was his fault that the communists had 
gained control in Afghanistan in the first place. However, 
36 percent said they would return, that they supported the 
King; and 12 percent claimed that they would return as long 
as the King had an Islamic government. 
RP) With the complete destruction of the economic 
infrastructure in Afghanistan, it was considered important 
to ask if the refugees would return if there were no jobs in 
Afghanistan. Ninety-six percent said, "Yes" they would and 
went on to explain to me that they were not fighting the war 
or living as refugees because of a concern over jobs, that 
the moment the war was over and there was an Islamic 
government, they would immediately return home. It became 
apparent, after interviews and conversations with refugee 
aid workers in Peshawar and Quetta, that the vast majority 
of farms, fields, houses and irrigation systems along border 
areas and areas of intense fighting within Afghanistan had 
been completely devastated by the Soviets in pursuing their 
"scorched earth policy." Despite what the Afghans said in 
interviews, the vast majority have become economic refugees 
on top of fleeing for fear of safety or out of ideological 
concerns. What remains to be seen is how the refugees deal 
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with their economic losses. The conversations and open 
ended answers indicated that many of the refugees knew their 
farms, £ields and houses had been destroyed; in some cases 
they were temporarily returning to Afghanistan and 
rebuilding or replanting and then returning to Pakistan. 
The refugees were also asked if they would return if 
there were no schools for their children. Eighty percent 
said "Yes" that they would return whether or not there were 
schools: and 18 percent insisted that, "If there was an 
Islamic government there would be schools." Only two people 
said that they would not return under those conditions. 
RP) An important concern for the refugees is the make 
up of the future government, an issue which I believe is not 
sufficiently recognized by the international communities. 
When asked if they would return if there was a coalition 
government with the communists and the Mujahideen, 80 
percent said, "No." Only 10 percent said "Yes," and this 
was only if the Mujahideen held the majority of the power in 
the government. 
RP) Since the refugees are so group oriented, they 
were asked if their families had the same opinions they were 
expressing. Seventy percent said, "Yes," and only one 
person said, "No." The remainder qualified their answers. 
RP) I felt it necessary to ask if there were any other 
important issues that I had not asked about. Fifty percent 
said, "No," while 16 percent said the refugees needed more 
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help and aid. Eleven percent expressed concerns about human 
rights and safety. Ten percent listed concerns about the 
political situation. 
RP) The refugees were asked when they thought all the 
refugees would go home. Only four percent actually gave a 
time, ranging from two months to a year. The rest would 
only list preconditions which had to be met before the 
refugees would leave. Twenty seven percent said, "When 
Allah wishes," or "Allah knows better." Thirty one 
percent said, "When there is an Islamic government and when 
the Russians leave." Six percent said, "When there is peace 
and the Russians leave." 
What these answers illustrate is that the refugees 
don't know or even have a set time themselves, which is a 
very frustrating situation if you are a refugee. More 
important is the fact that there are, according to the 
refugees interviewed, a number of preconditions which must 
be met before they will return. The most important of these 
was the withdrawal of the Russians. This is obviously not 
the only condition as evidenced by the continuing refusal of 
the refugees to repatriate. This listing of preconditions 
is tied directly to what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) had noted 
that the more the preconditions the lower the possibility of 
the intended behavior actually occurring. 
CHAPTER VII 
CROSS TABULATION/RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES 
When looking at the relationships among variables it 
should be noted that cross tabulations were done only in 
those areas identified in the hypotheses as dependent and 
independent variables. The independent variables were: 
reason for flight, age of respondent, family status, time in 
host country, ideological orientation, geographic distance 
or obstacles to return home, economic and socio-cultural 
assimilation in the host country, and then a set of personal 
perceptions of the refugees, including their perception of 
economic opportunities at home, the degree of socio-cultural 
similarity with the groups in the area they would be 
repatriating to, and finally their fear for personal safety 
when they do return. The dependent variables are the 
specific questions formatted as, "Would you return under 
these conditions?" The conditions include: Will you return 
to Afghanistan before the Soviet's withdrawal? Will you 
return if the Mujahideen and the Parties are fighting for 
power? Will you return before the removal of the mines? 
Would you return if King Zahir Shah ran the government? 
Will you return if there are no jobs in Afghanistan? Will 
you return if there are no schools in Afghanistan? and Would 
you return if there was a coalition government with the 
communists? 
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The literature suggests that if the original reason for 
flight continues, it will block willingness to repatriate. 
This would be a minus, or a push blocking return according 
to Bogue (1969) and Lee (1966). When the reasons for flight 
were cross tabulated against a willingness to return before 
the Soviets left, of those who fled due to the Russians, 100 
percent (N=28) said they would not return before the 
Russians withdrew. It should be noted that overall 99 
percent (N=99) of all respondents said they would not return 
before the Soviets left, whether they left due to fear for 
personal safety or out of opposition to communism. I 
believe that what this illustrates is that opposition to the 
Soviets was both ideological as well as relating to fear for 
personal safety, in that the Soviets were seen as both the 
cause of the threat to safety and as the promoters of 
communism. 
When the reasons for flight were cross tabbed against a 
willingness to repatriate if the Mujahideen and parties were 
fighting for power (which would be a minus or a push to keep 
refugees from returning), it was found that 89.3 percent 
(N=25) of those who said they had fled because of the 
Russians would not return if the parties were fighting for 
power, compa~ed to 55 percent (N=ll) of those who cited the 
Russians, war and invasion as their reason for leaving, 
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compared to 50 percent (N=12) of those who cited fighting, 
aggression and attacks and 42 percent (N=9) of those who 
cited communism and its opposition to Islam as their reason 
for leaving. In other words those most willing to return 
if the parties were fighting for power, were those who fled 
due to communism and its opposition to Islam (ideological 
concerns). This in my view supports the notion that those 
who fled for fear of personal safety were less willing to 
return if there is still a risk to their safety. (See Table 
x.) 
When asked about their concern over mines (which would 
be a minus or a push blocking return), 75 percent (N=21) of 
those who left because of the Russians said they would not 
return if the mines were still in place, compared to 65 
percent (N=13) of those who left due to the Russians, war 
and invasion, compared to 62.5 percent (N=15) of those who 
cited fighting, aggression and attacks, and 61.9 percent 
(N=13) of those who cited communism and its opposition to 
Islam. It is interesting to note that higher proportions 
of respondents say they will not return if the mines are 
still in place than if the parties were fighting for power. 
It would seem that those groups who cited fear for personal 
safety as a reason to flee are more concerned about the 
mines as a safety issue than the parties fighting for power. 
This is probably due to the fact that many people had 
already been killed or wounded by the mines, whereas the 
TABLE X 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE 
FIGHTING CROSS TABULATED WITH 
THE REASONS FOR LEAVING 
There'll 
be no 
fighting 
N 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Total Percent 
Why did you leave Yes No 
with an Don't 
Maybe Islam Gov. now 
Russians 1 
3.6 
5.0 
1. 0 
25 1 
89.3 3.6 
41.7 100.0 
25.0 1.0 
Russians and War 5 
Invasion or Invaders 25.0 
25.0 
5.0 
Fighting, Aggression 
or Attacks 
Communism and its 
Opposition to Islam 
Because of Revolution 
Put in Jail, or 
threatened 
Other 
6 
25.0 
30.0 
6.0 
6 
28.6 
30.0 
6.0 
1 
25.0 
5.0 
1. 0 
11 
55.0 
18.3 
11. 0 
12 
50.0 
20.0 
12.0 
9 
42.9 
15.0 
9.0 
1 
100.0 
1. 7 
1. 0 
1 
25.0 
1. 7 
1. 0 
1 1 
50.0 50.0 
5.0 5.0 
1.0 1.0 
Column 20 60 
Total 20.0 60.0 
1 
1. 0 
1 
3.6 
5.6 
1. 0 
3 
15.0 
16.7 
3.0 
6 
25.0 
33.3 
6.0 
6 
28.6 
33.3 
6.0 
2 
50.0 
11.1 
2.0 
18 
18.0 
1 
5.0 
100.0 
1. 0 
1 
1.0 
Total 
28 
28.0 
20 
20.0 
24 
24.0 
21 
21. 0 
1 
1. 0 
4 
4.0 
2 
2.0 
100 
100.00 
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issue of the parties fighting for power after the Soviet 
withdrawal was something hypothetical that might take place 
in the future. This finding might also be impacted by the 
belief that there would be no fighting among the parties. 
Eighteen percent of all the respondents {N=18) refused to 
answer this question "Yes" or "No" but would insist that 
there would be no fighting if there was an Islamic 
government. One observation recorded in my· field notes was 
of the six young men who were brought to me to be 
interviewed, each of them had lost a foot or leg or both 
feet so recently that blood was still seeping through the 
bandages on their stumps. Many mine victims were simply 
killed on the spot or died shortly after their injury. The 
mines were a very real danger and were recognized as such. 
{See TABLE XI.) 
When asked if they would return if there was not an 
Islamic government (which would be a minus or a push 
blocking return), only one person said "Yes"; this person 
had left because of communism and its opposition to Islam. 
One person said "Maybe" under these conditions; this person 
had fled because of the Russians. One person said he would 
prefer that there was an Islamic government; this person had 
fled due to Russians, war and invasion. One person didn't 
know, and one didn't answer. The other 95 respondents said 
they would not return if there were not an Islamic 
government. I think this illustrates that, even though many 
TABLE XI 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE MINES ARE IN PLACE 
CROSS TABULATED WITH THE REASONS 
FOR LEAVING AFGHANISTAN 
N 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Total Percent 
Why did you leave Yes 
Russians 7 
25.0 
21. 9 
7.0 
Russians and War 6 
Invasion or Invaders 30.0 
18.8 
6.0 
Fighting, Aggression 8 
or Attacks 33.3 
25.0 
8.0 
Communism and its 
Opposition to Islam 
Because of Revolution 
Put in Jail, or 
threatened 
8 
38.1 
25.0 
8.0 
3 
75.0 
No 
21 
75.0 
32.3 
21. 0 
13 
65.0 
20.3 
13.0 
15 
62.5 
23.1 
15.0 
13 
61. 9 
20.0 
13.0 
1 
100.0 
1. 5 
1. 0 
1 
25.0 
9.4 1.5 
Other 
3.0 1.0 
1 
50.0 
1. 5 
1. 0 
Column 32 65 
Total 32.0 65.0 
Would 
Maybe Prefer 
1 
5.0 
100.0 
1. 0 
1 
1.0 
1 
4.2 
50.0 
1. 0 
1 
50.0 
50.0 
1. 0 
2 
2.0 
Don't 
now Total 
28 
28.0 
20 
20.0 
24 
24.0 
21 
21. 0 
1 
1. 0 
4 
4.0 
2 
2.0 
100 
100.00 
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of the Afghans have very serious safety concerns, 
ideological considerations can be just as important or more 
important than safety issues. However, it is important to 
note that, despite what the Afghans I interviewed said, many 
aid workers believe that the Afghans would probably return 
under a broadly based coalition government. In an interview 
with the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate (a Pakistani), he 
insisted that, despite what the Afghans claimed about being 
unwilling to accept a non-Islamic government or a coalition 
government, as long as there was stability and an end to the 
fighting most Afghans would probably return home. 
When considering the issue of the Shah, overall 44 
percent (N=44) said they would not return if King Zahir Shah 
returned to run the government. These were fairly evenly 
distributed among the reasons for flight. The return of the 
Shah is an issue that for some people would be a positive 
pull to return or a plus, but for others would be a minus or 
a push blocking return. While recording the open ended 
responses, it was common for people to explain that they 
would return under Zahir Shah because he was their King and 
had the best hope of taking charge of the new government. 
Those who opposed the return of Zahir Shah would often add 
the comment that they opposed him because he had allowed the 
communists to take over and therefore the Afghan war was his 
fault. The issue of the return of Zahir Shah is similar to 
that of non-Islamic government. Even though many 
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respondents indicate that they would not return under the 
Shah, the Afghan Commissionerate and refugee aid workers in 
Peshawar and Quetta insisted in interviews and conversations 
that in fact the refugees would probably return even if they 
opposed Zahir Shah. One estimate quoted to me by members of 
the s.o.s. Belgium group (an aid agency) was that, if Zahir 
Shah returned, as many as 90 percent of all refugees would 
return, even those who opposed him. 
When asked if they would return under a coalition 
government, 95 percent (N=95) of the respondents said they 
would not return if there was a coalition government between 
the Mujahideen and the communists. The one respondent who 
said he would return under a coalition government had fled 
because of communism and its opposition to Islam. One 
respondent who fled because of the Russians said maybe he 
would return, and one respondent said he would prefer an 
Islamic government before he returned. There was also one 
"No," answer and one "Don't know." Due to the limited 
number of responses in these other categories, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the Afghans I spoke to 
appeared to feel very strongly about having an Islamic 
government. Again, what the Afghans claim and what I was 
told in interviews and conversations with Pakistani, Afghan 
and western aid workers were at times contradictory. Two 
UNHCR workers in Peshawar insisted that, except for the 
leaders, the political situation did not matter to the 
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common people, that as long as there was stability and the 
Russians left it did not really matter who ran the future 
government. 
All of the reasons for flight that were given by the 
refugees would fall under Kunz's definition of a "Reactive 
Fate Group," in that they were reacting to a situation 
(Kunz 1981, pg. 44). 
If there is a flight of pro-communist supporters out of 
Afghanistan with the fall of the communist regime, under 
Kunz's scheme they would be a "Self-Fulfilling Purpose 
Group" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). They would be considered this 
in that they were the makers of their own situation. 
The first hypothesis would be supported in that the 
issues most closely related to the reasons for flight (such 
as Soviet presence, a communist government, the possibility 
of the parties fighting and the existence of mines) that 
still existed were identified by the majority of refugees as 
conditions under which they would not return. I believe 
this illustrates that Bogue's and Lee's original contention 
about migration would be supported: that the decision to 
migrate is to a certain extent based on the sum of "pluses" 
and "minuses" (Lee 1966, pp. 50-52) or "pushes" and "pulls" 
(Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). 
Normally it is difficult if not impossible to really 
test the relationship between intention and actual behavior 
(unless one follows the subjects over time). I think though 
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that, based on what has happened since 1988, and what the 
refugees interviewed for this project said, we can assume a 
correlation between intention and actual behavior. Despite 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February, 1989, twenty-
three months later the UNHCR estimated that five percent or 
less of the refugees had repatriated (based on conversations 
with UNHCR personnel). What this means is that the first 
hypothesis would be supported by observable behavior; that 
is, the more factors causing flight that still remain, the 
less the likelihood of repatriation. I believe that even 
more important is the fact that a number of factors have 
arisen since the original causes of flight, and they also 
can and have blocked return. The issue of the parties 
fighting or the Shah returning, the removal of the mines, 
and economic devastation are just a few examples. 
The following cross tabulations using age as an 
independent variable are tests of the hypothesis which 
states, "The relationship between age and probability of 
repatriation is curvilinear." Age was chosen due to Lee's 
identification of it as a way to identify stages in a life 
cycle (Lee 1966, pp. 51-52). When age is used as an 
independent variable in determining willingness to 
repatriate, there is little or no variation for some 
dependent variables. As stated previously, only one person 
said he would return before the withdrawal of the Soviets; 
this person was in the 55-64 year old range. All other 
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respondents said they would not return before the Soviets 
withdrew. The responses have so little variation that it is 
not possible to support or reject the hypothesis in this 
case. 
When age was used as the independent variable in 
determining whether or not people would return home if the 
parties were fighting for power, the highest percentage of 
those who said that they would not return home were the 
youngest group interviewed. For the 15-24 year olds 76.2 
percent (N=16) said they would not return under these 
conditions. This compares to the 25-34 year old category in 
which 59.4 percent (N=19) said they would not return under 
these conditions. Between ages 35 and 44, 70 percent (N=14) 
said they would not return. Between ages 45 and 54, 42.9 
percent (N=six) said they would not return if the parties 
were fighting. Fifty percent (N=four) in the 55-64 year old 
group said they would not return under these conditions; and 
the 65-70 year old group had 20 percent (N=one) who said he 
would not. (See Table XII.) While on the surf ace there 
appears to be a curvilinear relationship, some of the cells 
are so small (one or two cases), that one cannot say a clear 
relationship exists. One general relationship that does 
come out is that up to age 44 those who say they will not 
return if the parties are fighting outnumber those who would 
by six to one. After the age of 45, those who say they will 
return and those who say they will not return are almost 
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TABLE XII 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING 
CROSS TABULATED WITH 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 
N There'll 
Row Percent be no 
column Percent fighting 
Total Percent with an No Row 
Age Yes No Maybe Islam Gov.Answer Total 
15-24 3 16 2 21 
14.3 76.2 9.5 21. 0 
15.0 26.7 11.1 
3.0 16.0 2.0 
25-34 5 19 7 1 32 
15.6 59.4 21. 9 3.1 32.0 
25.8 31. 7 38.9 100.0 
5.0 19.0 7.0 1. 0 
35-44 1 14 5 20 
5.0 70.0 25.0 20.0 
5.0 23.3 27.8 
1. 0 14.0 5.0 
45-54 7 6 1 14 
50.0 42.9 7.1 14.0 
35.0 10.0 5.6 
7.0 6.0 1. 0 
55-64 3 4 1 8 
37.5 50.0 12.5 8.0 
15.0 6.7 5.6 
3.0 4.0 1. 0 
65-70 1 1 1 2 5 
20.0 20.0 20.0 40.0 5.0 
5.0 1.7 100.0 11. 1 
1. 0 1. 0 1. 0 2.0 
Column 20 60 1 18 1 100 
Total 20.0 60.0 1. 0 18.0 1. 0 100.0 
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evenly divided. While there does not appear to be a 
curvilinear relationship, there appears to be a roughly 
increasing willingness to return if the parties are fighting 
as one gets older. Perhaps the older respondents did not 
believe the parties would fight, or maybe they did not 
believe it would involve them if they did. Another 
consideration is that the younger respondents (between 
15-24) have in some cases spent more than half of their 
lives in refuge in Pakistan; perhaps they are not as 
attached to Afghanistan as those who have lived in their 
homeland most of their lives. These findings would not 
support the hypothesis about a curvilinear relationship 
between age and willingness to repatriate. 
When age was cross tabulated with the question of 
whether the refugees would return before the mines were 
removed, 61.9 percent (N=13) of the 15-24 age group said 
they would not return before the mines were removed, while 
65.6 percent (N=21) of the 25-34 age group said they would 
not return. This compares to 75 percent (N=15) of the 35-44 
age group who said they would not return, 57.1 percent 
(N=eight) of the 45-54 group, 37.5 percent (N=three) of the 
55-64 age group, and 100 percent (N=five) of the 65-70 year 
old group. (See Table XIII.) 
I believe that this pattern is due to the fact that the 
youngest group has no children and are still very 
ideologically orientated, while the lower middle and middle 
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TABLE XIII 
WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES 
CROSS TABULATED WITH 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 
N 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Total Percent Would No Row 
Age Yes No Maybe Prefer Answer Total 
15-24 6 13 1 1 21 
28.6 61. 9 4.8 4.8 21. 0 
18.8 20.0 100.0 50.0 
6.0 13.0 1. 0 1. 0 
25-34 11 21 32 
34.4 .65. 6 32.0 
34.4 32.3 
11. 0 21. 0 
35-44 4 15 1 20 
20.0 75.0 5.0 20.0 
12.5 23.1 50.8 
4.0 15.0 1. 0 
45-54 6 8 14 
42.9 57.1 14.0 
18.8 12.3 
6.0 8.0 
55-64 5 3 8 
62.5 37.5 8.0 
15.6 4.6 
5.0 3.0 
65-70 5 5 
100.0 5.0 
7.7 
5.0 
Column 32 65 1 2 100 
Total 32.0 65.0 1. 0 2.0 100.0 
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age groups have many dependents. The upper middle age 
group's children are grown adults, while the very elderly 
are frail and dependent on their children who have young 
children of their own. Even though this would suggest a 
curvilinear relationship, some of the differences between 
cells are only one case. The general conclusion that can be 
drawn is that the least willing to return are those between 
65-70 followed by those between 35-44. This would reject 
the hypothesis. 
Everett s. Lee has suggested that besides being related 
to stages in a life cycle, age ·may also be related to 
dependence in that whereas children are bound to their 
parents, when they become older, they might leave the 
parents, and become married and soon have children of their 
own (Lee 1966, pp. 51-52). In other words perhaps the 
important relationship may be that of one to his or her 
dependents. 
When age is cross tabbed by willingness to return under 
a non-Islamic government, between 90.5 percent and 100 
percent of all age groups said they would not return if 
there was a non-Islamic government. These findings do not 
support the hypothesis. The one conclusion that can be 
drawn is that most Afghans say that they oppose a non-
Islamic government. Based on the open ended responses 
collected during the interviews, it was evident that most of 
the Afghans equate a non-Islamic government with a communist 
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government. It should be noted here, as mentioned 
previously, that what the Afghan respondents I interviewed 
said and what many experts believe they will do are quite 
different. 
In regard to the relationship between age and 
willingness to return if the Shah ran the government, the 
distribution of "Yes," "No," "Maybe," and "Yes if he has an 
Islamic government," appeared to be randomly distributed, 
with no clear pattern. There is a lot of diversity on the 
approval of the Shah. These findings do not support the 
hypothesis op a curvilinear relationship between age and 
willingness to return. 
When considering age and willingness to return if there 
are no jobs, the issue of no jobs at home was one that Sidni 
Lamb identified in his study of Ethiopian returnees, who 
fled immediately after return due to economic hardship (Lamb 
1986, pg. 9). The only person who said he would not return 
if there were no jobs was between 55-64. Two people from 
the 25-34 category said, "Maybe," as well as one person 
between 45-54. The other 96 percent {N=96) said they would 
return if there were no jobs. On this issue there appears 
to be a great deal of unanimity among the various age 
groups. Certainly for the 23 percent {N=23) of the 
respondents who had been farmers it was a non sequitur; all 
they have to do to have jobs is to return home to their 
farms and start farming again. For those who had been 
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farmers a common open ended response was, "Sure I will go 
back if there are no jobs; I am a farmer and will return to 
my fields; that is my job." Even though the Afghans do not 
appear to be concerned about the lack of available jobs, it 
is clear from conversations and interviews conducted in 
Pakistan with aid workers that Afghanistan has been 
economically devastated; I therefore would question whether 
or not returning refugees might return to host countries 
once this becomes evident to them as well. This has 
happened to other refugee populations that have returned 
home willingly but are unable to stay due to lack of 
economic opportunities. Such was the case among Ethiopian, 
Ugandan and Laotian refugees. As Jeff Crisp noted in an 
article on Laotian refugees, some fled repeatedly, were 
forced to return, and then would flee again immediately 
again due to economic hardships (Crisp , September 1987, pp. 
27-28). As a matter of fact many authors have identified 
the importance of the economic situation at home (Akol 1987, 
pp. 156, Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). 
On the issue of age and willingness to return if there 
are no schools, only two people said they would not return 
if there were no schools, one was between 35-44 and the 
other between 45-54. The 18 percent (N=18) who said, "If 
there is an Islamic government there will be school," were 
very evenly distributed among all the age categories. The 
same is true for the 80 percent (N=80) who said they would 
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return if there were no schools: they were evenly 
distributed among all age groups. Although the common 
answer was that they would return even without schools, it 
was often mentioned to me after interviews or in private 
conversations that students in school in Pakistan would 
probably stay and finish before returning home to 
Afghanistan. One highly educated Afghan (he had a graduate 
degree from Oxford) insisted in a private conversation that 
he would encourage students to finish their educations 
before returning to Afghanistan because educated and 
.technically skilled people were desperately needed after the 
long and devastating war. 
The issue of returning under a coalition government was 
very similar to returning if there were no schools: overall 
80 percent (N=80) said they would not return under a 
coalition government, and the distribution was fairly evenly 
divided among the different age categories. The degree to 
which the Afghans opposed the concept of a coalition 
government is not a surprising one. They deeply opposed the 
communists on ideological grounds as well as for pragmatic 
safety reasons. Compromise is not one of the Afghans' great 
strengths. They have carried out blood feuds over decades. 
They strongly opposed communist involvement in a future 
government. As noted in the beginning on the methods 
section, no one believed in 1988 that the communist 
government would last, so agreeing to a coalition was not 
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necessary. As Akol (1987, pg. 156), Bogue (1969, pg. 753) 
and Kunz (1981, pp. 42-62) pointed out, the political 
situation in the home country can create a push to drive 
people out or prevent return. 
Based on these findings the hypothesis stating that 
there would be a curvilinear relationship in regard to age 
and willingness to repatriate would be rejected, although 
Lee's original contention about age and stage of life cycle 
does seem to have an impact in some areas (Lee 1966, pp. 51-
52). 
The next hypothesis to be tested has to do with family 
status and states, "The concerns about safety will vary with 
the number of dependents." This hypothesis attempts to test 
whether concerns about safety and reluctance to repatriate 
increase with a greater number of dependents. The issue of 
dependency has been identified by numerous authors, most 
notably Bogue (1969, pg. 754) and Kunz (1981, pp. 42-46). 
To measure the dimension of "family status" marital 
status and number of children were utilized. Age of 
youngest child was also collected to see if those with 
younger children were more concerned about safety. When 
considering marital status and the effect on willingness to 
return before the Soviets withdrew, the only person who said 
he would return was a widower. The three other widowers 
said they would not return. This would not support or 
reject the hypothesis because it is so limited. 
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When considering marital status cross tabbed with 
willingness to return if the parties were fighting, it was 
found that 70 percent (N=14) of the single respondents said, 
they would not return. Of the married respondents, 57.9 
percent (N=44) indicated they would not return and 50 
percent (N=2) of the widowed said they would not return. A 
large proportion of the married men, 22 percent (N=17), felt 
there would be no fighting once there was an Islamic 
government. There were only four widowers in the entire 
sample, so any conclusions about their unwillingness to 
return is not very reliable. Since so many married men 
believed there would be no fighting, they had the smallest 
group who actually said, "Yes" they would return. Of those 
who were married, only 18 percent (N=14) said they would 
return if the parties were fighting, compared to 25 percent 
(N=f ive) of the single men and 25 percent (N=one) of the 
widowers. However, since the number of widowed respondents 
was so small, the only reliable comparison is between those 
who are married and those who are single. Those who are 
single are more willing to return, which would support the 
hypothesis on number of dependents affecting willingness to 
return. (See Table XIV.) 
When considering concerns about mines, 60 percent 
(N=12) of the single respondents said they would not return 
before the mines were removed compared to 65.8 percent 
(N=50) of the married and 75 percent (N=three) of the 
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TABLE XIV 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING 
CROSS TABULATED WITH 
MARITAL STATUS 
N There'll 
Row Percent be no 
Column Percent fighting 
Total Percent Would with an Don't Row 
Marital Status Yes No Prefer Islam Gov. Know Total 
Single 5 14 1 20 
25.0 70.0 5.0 20.0 
25.0 23.3 5.6 
5.0 14.0 1. 0 
Married 14 44 17 1 76 
18.4 57.9 22.4 1. 3 76.0 
70.0 73.3 94.4 100.0 
14.0 44.0 17.0 1. 0 
Widowed 1 2 1 4 
25.0 50.0 25.0 4.0 
5.0 3.3 100.0 
1. 0 2.0 1. 0 
Column 20 60 1 18 1 100 
Total 20.0 60.0 1. 0 18.0 1. 0 100.0 
widowed respondents. 
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The single are slightly more willing 
to return than those who are married, which would support 
the hypothesis about willingness to return and number of 
dependents. (See Table XV.) 
For the safety issues of the withdrawal of the 
Russians, the parties fighting for power and the removal of 
the mines, the findings would support the hypothesis that 
those with dependents are less willing to return than those 
without dependents. 
To further test the hypothesis on willingness to return 
and the relationship to number of dependents, the number of 
children and age of youngest child are compared to 
willingness to return. 
The one person who was willing to return under the 
Russians had six children. This is too limited to draw any 
conclusions. 
When checking how dependents affected willingness to 
repatriate if the parties were fighting amongst themselves 
for power, 69 percent (N=l8} of the people without children 
said they would not return under this circumstance, 66.7 
percent (N=six) of those with one child said they would not 
return, 70 percent (N=seven) of those with two children said 
they would not. This compares to 33.3 percent (N=two) of 
those with three children, 72.7 percent (N=eight) of those 
with four children, 80 percent (N=eight) of those with five 
children, 55.6 percent (N=five) of those with six children, 
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TABLE xv 
WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES 
CROSS TABULATED WITH 
MARITAL STATUS 
N 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Total Percent Would No Row 
Marital Status Yes No Maybe Prefer Answer Total 
Single 8 12 20 
40.0 60.0 20.0 
25.0 18.5 
8.0 12.0 
Married 23 50 1 2 76 
30.3 65.8 1. 3 2.6 76.0 
71.9 76.9 100.0 100.0 
23.0 50.0 1. 0 2.0 
Widowed 1 3 4 
25.0 75.0 4.0 
3.1 4.6 
1. 0 3.0 
Column 32 65 1 2 100 
Total 32.0 65.0 1. 0 2.0 100.0 
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and 31.6 percent (N=six) of those with seven or more 
children who said they would not return if the parties were 
fighting for power. While it appears that as the number of 
children increases, concerns about parties fighting 
increases up to five children where it starts to decrease, 
it should be noted that those with six or more children had 
22 percent (N=two) of their group which believed that there 
will be no fighting under an Islamic government as did those 
who had seven or more children which had 26.3 percent 
(N=five) of their group that did not believe there would be 
any fighting. These findings would not support the 
hypothesis in regards to number of dependents affecting 
willingness to return. I think that the real relationship 
being illustrated here is a function of the respondents' 
age. Those who were in their teens and early twenties up to 
those who were in their late forties and early fifties were 
the least willing to return under these conditions. Those 
who were 55 and older were increasingly more willing to 
return under these conditions. One possibility is that the 
older Afghans have older children and do not view the safety 
issues the same way as those with primarily younger children 
do. 
When the same people were asked if they would return 
before the mines were removed from the country, 61.5 percent 
(N=16) of those without children said they would not return 
before the mines were removed; this group was also the 
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youngest of all respondents. Of those with one child, 33.3 
percent (N=three) said they would not return before the 
removal of the mines. This compares to 70 percent (N=seven) 
of those with two children, 83.3 percent (N=five) of those 
with three children, 72.7 percent (N=eight) of those with 
four children, 80 percent (N=eight) of those with five 
children, 55.6 percent (N=five) of those with six children, 
and 68.4 percent (N=13) of those with seven or more 
children, who said they would not return. 
The variation here does not appear to follow any 
general pattern in relationship to the increasing number of 
dependents. This would not support the hypothesis about 
number of dependents affecting willingness to return. 
When using number of dependents, and the effect on 
willingness to return if there is not an Islamic government, 
the one person who said he would return if there was not an 
Islamic government had six children. This is so limited 
that it cannot be used to test this hypothesis. 
To see if number of dependents affected willingness to 
return in areas other than safety issues, some other 
relationships were tested. 
The effect of number of children on willingness to 
return under the Shah had a lot of variation among the 
responses. Of those with no children 53.8 percent (N=14) 
did not want to return under the Shah. Those with one child 
had 77.8 percent (N=7) of their group who said they would 
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not return under the Shah; but then the next group, those 
with two children, had only 30 percent (N=three) saying they 
would not return under the Shah. This compares to those 
with three children in which 66.7 percent (N=four) said they 
would not return, those with four children in which 27.3 
percent (N=three) said they would not, those with five 
children where 40 percent {N=four) said they would not, 
those with six children where 22.2 percent {N=two) who said 
they would not, and those with seven or more children where 
36.8 percent {N=seven) said they would not return under the 
Shah. There does not appear to be any relationship between 
number of dependents and willingness to return under the 
Shah. The return of the Shah does not appear to be 
considered a safety issue but an ideological one. There is 
a great deal of diversity on this answer. 
When looking at the effect the number of dependents has 
on willingness to return if there are no jobs in 
Afghanistan, the only respondent who said he would not 
return if there were no jobs, had seven or more children. 
Three respondents said maybe they would return if there were 
no jobs; they had, respectively, two children, four children 
and six children. This is one topic in which there is so 
much unanimity that it is difficult to discern any pattern 
The effect of number of children on willingness to 
return if there is no schools is an interesting one. There 
were two respondents who said they would not return if there 
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were no schools, one had no children and the other had six 
children. Out of all the respondents, 80 percent (N=80) 
said they would return if there were no schools. The other 
category had 18 percent (N=l8) who said that if there was an 
Islamic government there would be schools. These 
respondents were fairly evenly distributed among all 
categories of number of dependents. The one category which 
stood out were those with seven or more children. From this 
group, 42 percent (N=eight) said that if there was an 
Islamic government there would be schools. 
When looking at the effect of number of children on 
willingness to return if there is a coalition government, 
those who said they would not return under a coalition 
government were fairly evenly distributed among the various 
categories of numbers of children. Overall 80 percent 
(N=80) said they would not return under these conditions, 
and among the various categories it ran from a high of 100 
percent (N=six) of those with three children to a low of 
45.5 percent (N=five) among those with four children. 
When considering safety and willingness to return based 
on number of dependents, since the one person who would 
return under the Russians had a child, and there was no 
clear relationship for number of children and returning if 
the parties are fighting or before the removal of the mines, 
this hypothesis would not be supported based on the answers 
given by the respondents I interviewed. I feel though that 
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this is an area that would benefit from further research. 
One drawback to the previous hypothesis test was that 
people would say yes they had children even if the children 
were in their twenties. For the Afghans a person in his/her 
late teens is a young adult, so they are probably not seen 
in the same way as young children. To further test this 
hypothesis, age of youngest child was used to see if the 
issue of dependency and its relationship to willingness to 
migrate might be correlated as Bogue had described in his 
work {1969}. 
When looking at the age of the youngest child and how 
this affects willingness to return under the Russians, a 
respondent with the youngest child between 15-18 was the 
only person who said he would return before the Russians 
left. This is too limited to draw any conclusions. 
When using the child's age as the independent variable 
influencing the willingness to return if the parties were 
fighting, it was found that 62 percent (N=31} of those whose 
youngest children were five years old or less were not 
willing to return if the parties were fighting for power, 
compared to 54.5 percent {N=six} of those with a youngest 
child of 6-10 and 33.3 percent {N=two} of those with a 
youngest child of 11-14. {See Table XVI.} Therefore as the 
youngest child's age increases so does the willingness to 
return if the parties are fighting for power. Of the 
respondents who had their youngest child between 15-18 and 
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TABLE XVI 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE PARTIES ARE FIGHTING 
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE 
OF YOUNGEST CHILD 
N There'll 
Row Percent be no 
Column Percent fighting 
Total Percent with an Don't Row 
Child's Age Yes No Maybe Islam Gov Know Total 
none 6 18 2 26 
23.1 69.2 7.7 26.0 
30.0 30.0 11.1 
6.0 18.0 2.0 
5 or less 6 31 12 1 50 
12.0 62.0 24.0 2.0 50.0 
30.0 51. 7 66.7 100.0 
6.0 31. 0 12.0 1. 0 
6-10 3 6 2 11 
27.3 54.5 18.2 11. 0 
15.0 10.0 11.1 
3.0 6.0 2.0 
11-14 2 2 1 1 6 
33.3 33.3 16.7 16.7 6.0 
10.0 3.3 100.0 5.6 
2.0 2.0 1. 0 1. 0 
15-18 1 1 2 
50.0 50.0 2.0 
5.0 1. 7 
1. 0 1. 0 
19-22 1 2 1 4 
25.0 50.0 25.0 4.0 
5.0 3. 3 5.6 
1. 0 2.0 1. 0 
23 + 1 1 
100.0 1.0 
5.0 
1. 0 
Column 20 60 1 18 1 100 
Total 20.0 60.0 1. 0 18.0 1. 0 100.0 
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those whose youngest child was between 19-22, 50 percent 
said they would not return if the parties were fighting for 
power; however, there were only one or two respondents in 
each of the respective cells, so it is very inconclusive for 
those with children above the age of 15. Even though this 
finding is inconclusive due to the limited number of cases 
of youngest child above the age of 11, I believe that it is 
worth noting in that it indicates the possibility that this 
hypothesis may be correct. 
As the youngest child'~ age increases, so does the 
parent's willingness increase slightly to repatriate if 
there are still mines in Afghanistan. Sixty-eight percent 
(N=34) of those with children five or less said they would 
not return under these conditions; 63.6 percent (N=seven) of 
those with children six to 10 said, "No," and 66.7 percent 
(N=4) of those with children 11-14 said, ''No." Those with 
children 15-18 said, "No," 50 percent (N=one) of the time. 
Due to the limited number of cases it is impossible to draw 
any reliable conclusions for those with children between 11-
18. (See Table XVII.) 
These findings are very limited, but I believe they 
indicate that the hypothesis about family status and 
willingness to repatriate may be supported with further 
research. This would support Bogue's identification of this 
as a factor affecting migration (1969). 
Issues other than safety were checked to see if they 
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TABLE XVII 
WILL YOU RETURN BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE MINES 
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE 
OF YOUNGEST CHILD 
N 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Total Percent Would No Row 
Child's Age Yes No Maybe Pref er Answer Total 
none 9 16 1 26 
34.6 61. 5 3.8 26.0 
28.1 24.6 50.0 
9.0 16.0 1. 0 
5 or less 14 34 1 1 50 
28.0 68.0 2.0 2.0 50.0 
43.8 52.3 100.0 50.0 
14. 0 34.0 1. 0 1. 0 
6-10 4 7 11 
36.4 36.6 11. 0 
12.5 10.8 
4.0 7.0 
11-14 2 4 6 
33.3 66.7 6.0 
6.3 6.2 
2.0 4.0 
15-18 1 1 2 
50.0 50.0 2.0 
3. 1 1. 5 
1. 0 1. 0 
19-22 1 3 4 
25.0 75.0 4.0 
3. 1 4.6 
1. 0 3.0 
23 + 1 1 
100.0 1. 0 
3. 1 
1. 0 
Column 32 65 1 2 100 
Total 32.0 65.0 1. 0 2.0 100.0 
------·--·--
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were impacted as well. There is very little variation in 
willingness to return under a coalition government when 
cross tabbed with age of youngest child. The one respondent 
who said he would return had a child less than five; there 
was also one respondent with a child between six and 10 who 
said maybe he would return under a coalition government. 
An interesting trend is noticed in the relationship 
between the youngest child's age and willingness to return 
if the Shah returned to run the government in Afghanistan. 
Forty six percent (N=23) of those with children five or less 
said they would not return under these conditions. Thirty-
six percent (N=four) of those with youngest children between 
six to 10 said, "No," and only 16.7 percent (N=one) of those 
with youngest children between 11-14 said, "No." A more 
reliable indicator (due to larger number of respondents) is 
those who said, "Yes they would return if the Shah returned 
to run the government." Of those with youngest children 
five or less 34 percent (N=17) said yes they would return. 
Of those with youngest children between six to 10, 45.5 
percent (N=f ive) said they would return and of those with 
youngest children between 11-14, 66.7 percent (N=four) said 
they would return. Between 15-18 there was only one 
respondent, too small to be reliable. (See Table XVIII.) 
As the age of youngest child increases the willingness 
to return under the Shah does too. 
When considering youngest child's age and the 
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TABLE XVIII 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE SHAH RETURNS 
CROSS TABULATED WITH AGE 
OF YOUNGEST CHILD 
N Yes, if 
Row Percent there 
Column Percent is an I'll 
Total Percent Islamic Fight Don't Row 
Child's Age Yes No Maybe Gov. Hirn Know Total 
none 7 14 3 1 1 26 
26.9 53.8 11. 5 3.8 3.8 26.0 
19.4 31. 8 50.0 8.3 100.0 
7.0 14.0 3.0 1. 0 1. 0 
5 or less 17 23 2 7 1 50 
34.0 46.0 4.0 14.0 2.0 50.0 
7.2 52.3 33.3 58.3 100.0 
17.0 23.0 2.0 7.0 1. 0 
6-10 5 4 2 11 
45.5 36.4 18.2 11. 0 
13.9 9.1 16.7 
5.0 4.0 2.0 
11-14 4 1 1 6 
66.7 16.7 16.7 6.0 
11.1 2. 3 16.7 
4.0 1. 0 1. 0 
15-18 1 1 2 
50.0 50.0 2.0 
2.8 2. 3 
1. 0 1. 0 
19-22 1 1 2 4 
25.0 25.0 50.0 4.0 
2.8 2. 3 16.7 
1. 0 1. 0 2.0 
23 + 1 1 
100.0 1. 0 
2.8 
1.0 
Column 36 44 6 12 1 1 100 
Total 36.0 44.0 6.0 12.0 1. 0 1. 0 100.0 
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willingness to return if there are no jobs, there is very 
little variation. The one respondent who said he would 
return if there were no jobs had a youngest child between 
15-18. Two people who had youngest children less than five 
said maybe they would return if there were no jobs. Also, 
one person with a youngest child between 6-10 said maybe 
they would return. The other 96 percent (N=96) said they 
would return if there were no jobs. 
When asked if they would return if there were no 
schools, only two people said they would not return, one 
with no children and one who had a youngest child who was 
five or. less. Many with children, believed that if there 
was an Islamic government, that there would be schools. Of 
those with children five or less, 22 percent (N=ll) said 
there would be schools if there was an Islamic government. 
Of those with youngest children between six to 10, 36.4 
percent (N=f our) said there would be schools if there was an 
Islamic government. 
There appears to be little effect of children's age on 
the willingness to repatriate if there is a coalition 
government. Of those with youngest children five or less, 
74 percent (N=37) said they would not return if there was a 
coalition government. Of those with youngest children 
between 6-10, 90.9 percent (N=lO) said they would not 
return. For those with youngest children between 11-14, 
83.3 percent (N=five) said they would not return. Those 
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with youngest children between 15-18 were 100 percent 
{N=two) opposed to returning under a coalition. The same is 
true for those with the youngest child between 19-22 and 
over the age of 23, in that they were very opposed to 
returning (75 percent to 100 percent) but there were only 
three or one cases in each cell. 
The next hypothesis to be tested states, "The greater 
the time that a refugee spends out of the home country the 
less the likelihood of repatriation." The refugees in this 
study were asked when they fled and this was then compared 
to their willingness to repatriate under certain conditions. 
The effect of when a respondent fled on their 
willingness to return before the soviets left is not 
possible to determine since only one respondent said he 
would return before the Soviets withdrew. That person had 
been in exile for 3-4 years. 
When looking at the effect time in refuge has on a 
willingness to repatriate, there appears to be little 
relationship to the matter of whether the parties are 
fighting for power. Overall 60 percent {N=60) said they 
would not return if the parties were fighting. Comparing 
the different categories of those who had been out of 
Afghanistan for various times and said they would not return 
ranged from a high of 75 percent to a low of 43 percent with 
no discernible pattern. The same situation exists for when 
someone left and if they are willing to return before the 
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mines are removed. Those who said they would not return 
before the mines were removed based on when they left, 
varies from 57 percent to 75 percent, with no discernible 
pattern. The one person who was willing to return if there 
was not an Islamic government had left Afghanistan between 
nine to 10 years before. Willingness to return under the 
Shah and the length of time as a refugee shows an 
interesting relationship. Of those who had been refugees 
only one year or less 75 percent (N=three) said they would 
not return if the Shah came back, compared to 67 percent 
(N=four) of those in refuge for one to two years, 69 percent 
(N=ll) of those who had left three to four years before, 38 
percent (N=eight) of those who had left five to six years 
before, 39 percent (N=ll) of those who had left seven to 
eight years before, and only 30 percent (N=nine) of those 
who had left nine to 10 years before. The longer people had 
been out of the country the more willing they were to return 
under the Shah. (See Table XVIII!.) 
The effect of the length of time that someone had been 
out of the country on willingness to return if there are no 
jobs available is not possible to discern because only one 
person said he would not return if there were no jobs. This 
person had left the country five to six years before. Two 
people who had been out of the country seven to eight years 
said, "Maybe" they would return and one person who had been 
out of the country nine to 10 years said he maybe would 
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TABLE xv Iv 
WILL YOU RETURN IF THE SHAH RETURNS 
CROSS TABULATED WITH WHEN 
RESPONDENT FLED 
N Yes, if 
Row Percent he has I 
Column Percent an Will 
Total Percent Islamic Fight Don't Row 
When Did You Flee Yes No Maybe Gov. Him Know Total 
1 year 1 3 4 
25.0 75.0 4.0 
2.8 6.8 
1. 0 3.0 
1-2 years 1 4 1 6 
16.7 66.7 16.7 6.0 
2.8 9.1 16.7 
1. 0 4.0 1. 0 
3-4 years 3 11 1 1 16 
18.8 68.8 6.3 6.3 16.0 
8.3 25.0 16.7 8.3 
3.0 11. 0 1. 0 1. 0 
5-6 years 6 8 1 6 21 
28.6 38.1 4.8 28.6 21. 0 
16.7 18.2 16.7 50.0 
6.0 8.0 1. 0 6.0 
7-8 years 7 9 2 4 1 23 
30.4 39.1 8.7 17.4 4. 3 23.0 
19.4 20.5 33.3 33.3 100.0 
7.0 9.0 2.0 4.0 1. 0 
9-10 years 18 9 1 1 1 30 
60.0 30.0 3.3 3. 3 3.3 30.0 
50.0 20.5 16.7 8.3 100.0 
18.0 9.0 1. 0 1. 0 
Column 36 44 6 12 1 1 100 
Total 36.0 44.0 6.0 12.0 1. 0 1.0 100.0 
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return if there were no jobs. When this group was asked if 
they would return if there were no schools, only two people 
said, "No." One, had left Afghanistan three to four years 
before; the other had left five to six years before. The 
other category were those who answered, "If there is an 
Islamic government, there will be schools." Those who 
answered in this category were fairly evenly distributed 
between all of the various categories of time out of the 
country. This same group when asked about the willingness 
to repatriate under a coalition government roughly showed 
increasing willingness to do so the longer they had been out 
of the country: 100 percent (N=four) of those who had fled 
that year said they would not return under a coalition 
government, compared to 83.3 percent (N=five) of those who 
had fled one to two years before, 93.8 percent (N=15) of 
those who had fled three to four years before, 76.2 percent 
(N=16) of those who had fled five to six years before, 87 
percent (N=20) of those who fled seven to eight years before 
and 67.7 percent (N=20) of those who had fled nine to 10 
years before saying they would not return under a coalition 
government. (See Table XX.) This was an interesting finding 
in that it appears to reject the hypothesis that people 
would be less likely to repatriate the longer they were out 
of the country. This would support the position of Crisp in 
regards to the importance of time, but in the opposite way 
from that which he described (1987). However, it could 
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TABLE xx 
WILL YOU RETURN UNDER A COALITION GOVERNMENT 
CROSS TABULATED WITH WHEN 
RESPONDENT FLED 
N I 
Row Percent Will 
Column Percent If 
Total Percent Others No Don't Row 
When Did You Flee Yes No Maybe Do Other Answer Know Total 
1 year 4 4 
or less 100.0 4.0 
5.0 
4.0 
1-2 years 5 1 6 
83.0 16.7 6.0 
6.3 100.0 
5.0 1. 0 
3-4 years 1 15 16 
6.3 93.8 16.0 
10.0 18.8 
1. 0 15.0 
5-6 years 2 16 1 1 1 21 
9.5 76.2 4.8 4.8 4.8 21. 0 
20.0 20.0 100.0 100.0 16.7 
2.0 16.0 1. 0 1. 0 1. 0 
7-8 years 20 1 2 23 
87.0 4. 3 8.7 23.0 
25.0 100.0 3 3. 3 
20.0 1. 0 2.0 
9-10 years 7 20 3 30 
23.3 66.7 10.0 30.0 
70.0 25.0 50.0 
7.0 20.0 3.0 
Column 10 80 1 1 1 6 1 100 
Total 10.0 80.0 1. 0 1.0 1. 0 6.0 1.0 100.0 
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indicate also that people are less and less concerned about 
the conditions at home because they have less and less 
intention to return and hence are willing to say they would 
return no matter what. Another possibility is that the 
longer the Afghans were in refuge the more desperate they 
were to return home under any condition. This is possibly 
related to the "Ideological National Orientation Abroad" as 
identified by Kunz (1981, pp. 44-46}. Those who maintain a 
homeward orientation and do not become eager 
assimilationists may in fact find time to be an intervening 
variable which works as a "push" to return home instead of 
roadblock to return. The longer the "homeward oriented 
view" (Kunz 1981, pg. 44} refugee remains in refuge the more 
frustrated and determined the refugee becomes to eventually 
repatriate. 
Tied to the issue of time is the hypothesis that the 
general population over time will become more pragmatic in 
their concerns, while the leadership will become more 
ideological in their concerns (Crisp 1987, Kunz 1981). As 
has been noted earlier only one person was willing to return 
before Soviet withdrawal; he had been out of the country 
three to four years. In regards to whether the parties were 
fighting for power or the mines had not been removed there 
did not appear to be any relationship to how long the 
general population had been out of the country. 
If there was not an Islamic government the two people 
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who said, "Yes" or "Maybe" they would return, had been out 
of the country for nine to 10 years, which is interesting 
but so limited in numbers that all one can suggest is that 
it warrants further investigation. 
With regards to the hypothesis that pragmatic concerns 
would increase over time in refuge, people seem to be more 
willing to accept the Shah and a coalition government the 
longer they had been in refuge. The issues of returning 
with no schools or no jobs or a non-Islamic government 
indicate that people might be more pragmatic over time but 
if they are it is a very slight increase and needs further 
research. There doesn't appear to be any increase over fear 
of parties fighting or of mines over time. For this 
hypothesis, one can not accept or reject it at this point. 
Further studies are needed to see if people do become more 
pragmatic. 
When comparing those in positions of leadership (tribal 
leaders and commanders), all but one of the eight leaders 
had been out of the country for eight to ten years. One 
leader had been out of Afghanistan for four years. 
Unfortunately the sample of leaders was not large enough to 
detect any significant variation over time. Statistically 
the categorized answers of the leaders were not 
significantly different from those of the everyday people. 
However, when referring to field notes made following the 
interviews of five commanders and leaders over a several day 
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period, I had noted that in the open ended responses and 
conversations the leaders were very dogmatic and very 
insistent about the importance of Islam and the removal of 
the Russians. They also were the most insistent that there 
would never be fighting between the parties and that a 
coalition government would never be formed. While some 
answers of the general people seem to indicate a pragmatic 
shift over time, not enough data were collected to determine 
a shift among the leaders. However, the leaders certainly 
seemed to be more ideological, based on observations and 
conversations. While this might indicate the possibility of 
a relationship, further research is needed. 
Geographic obstacles have been noted as a feature that 
can block flight or repatriation. Lee noted the importance 
of geographic obstacles in his work in 1966 as an 
intervening variable. The next hypothesis to be tested 
states, "The greater the distance or other geographic 
obstacles, the less the likelihood of repatriation." In the 
case of the Afghans, distance is such an obstacle. For ease 
of analysis and comparison the provinces that the Afghans 
fled from will be broken down into those that are on the 
border with Pakistan or adjacent to provinces on the border 
and those that are not. Those that are on the border or 
very close to it and which respondents to this survey fled 
from are: Kabul, Ningrahar, Qandahar, Helmand, Laghman, 
Logar, and Paktia. Those provinces that respondents came 
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from that are not on the border or close to it are Jowzjan, 
Uruzgan, Kunduz and Kapisa. 
When looking at those who would be willing to return 
before the Soviets left, the one person who said, "Yes" was 
from Kabul, which is both adjacent to a border province and 
has a major road leading to it. 
When looking at the issue of who would return if the 
parties are fighting, the one respondent from Jowzjan, the 
one respondent from Uruzgan, one of the three respondents 
from Kunduz, and the one respondent from Kapisa all said 
they would not return under these conditions. Of 
respondents from the non border areas between 33.3 percent 
and 100 percent said they would not return under these 
conditions (three-fourths of the non border provinces had 
100 percent of their respondents who would not return). The 
respondents from the areas close to the border said they 
would not return at a low of 44.4 percent (N=four) from 
Logar and a high from Kabul of 63.6 percent (N=14) of the 
time. Because there were only one, two or three respondents 
from the outlying provinces, it is not possible to draw a 
firm conclusion about geographic distance determining 
willingness to repatriate. However, it can certainly be 
taken as a good possibility that geographic distance affects 
willingness to repatriate, and it needs to be recognized 
that this issue warrants further research. 
When looking at where people fled from and how that 
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affects their willingness to repatriate if there are still 
mines, the respondent from Jowzjan, the respondent from 
Uruzgan, two of the three respondents from Kunduz, and the 
one respondent from Kapisa all said they would not return if 
there were still mines. In other words between 66.7 percent 
and 100 percent of those from the outlying provinces said 
they would not return. Between 33.3 percent and 100 percent 
of respondents from border areas said they would not return. 
The same situation applies here in that the numbers away 
from the border areas are very small, but it indicates there 
might be a relationship, and further research should be 
conducted. 
While 95 percent (N=95) said they would not return if 
there was not an Islamic government, all respondents from 
the provinces not close to the border said they would not 
return if there was not an Islamic government. 
There didn't appear to be any pattern at all in regards 
to where people were from and whether or not they would 
return if the Shah returned to run the government. 
Willingness to return if there were not jobs in 
Afghanistan didn't seem to be impacted by where people were 
from. Except for people from Ningrahar (a border province) 
all other respondents said they would return if there were 
no jobs. Of those from Ningrahar, one said, "No" he would 
not return and three said, "Maybe" they would return if 
there were no jobs. 
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When considering how area fled from affected 
willingness to return if there were no schools, 
interestingly all of the respondents from provinces away 
from the border said that even if there were no schools they 
would return. The only respondents who said they would not 
return were from border provinces, but only two respondents 
said this. The other answer that those from border 
provinces gave was that, if there is an Islamic government 
there will be schools. Twenty percent overall answered this 
way. 
When considering how the distance one fled from affects 
their willingness to return if there is a coalition 
government, of those who fled from the four non border 
provinces, 83.3 percent (N=five) said they would not return 
if there was a coalition government. This is about the same 
as the response of those from border areas, of whom 85.2 
percent (N=75) said they would not return. 
Another geographic consideration is whether people fled 
from a rural area or from Kabul (the one urban area). The 
respondents from Kabul, as compared to other areas, showed 
no noticeable difference between Kabul and the rural 
provinces. While the findings are extremely limited due to 
the majority being from the border provinces, I believe the 
responses do indicate the possibility that the hypothesis 
about the greater the geographic obstacles the less the 
likelihood of repatriation could be supported with further 
research. This would support Lee's (1966) view of 
importance of intervening obstacles. 
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Another hypothesis to consider is: the greater the 
degree of economic assimilation in the host country the less 
the likelihood of repatriation (if they have jobs in the 
host country they will be less likely to repatriate). As 
has been noted, many authors have identified the importance 
of economics as an important factor in affecting migration 
(Akol 1987, pg. 156, Lamb 1986, pg. 9). Donald Bogue {1969) 
has further identified econbmic opportunities in the host 
country as an important pull into the host country for 
·migrants. As has been mentioned previously, only one person 
said he would return before the Soviets withdrew; this 
person had a job. 
Of those who had jobs, 76.1 percent (N=48) said that 
they would not return if the parties were fighting for 
power; this compares to 54.5 percent (N=l2} of those not 
having jobs saying they would not return. Whether or not 
one has a job does seem to affect willingness to return if 
the parties were fighting for power. This would support the 
hypothesis. 
When considering the effect of someone having a job on 
willingness to return if there are still mines, 63.6 percent 
(N=14) of those without jobs said they would not return 
compared to 67.1 percent (N=51) of those with jobs. Because 
of the number of cases this is a small difference but it 
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could indicate a relationship here. This would support the 
hypothesis. 
Whether or not someone had a job did not seem to impact 
their willingness to return if there was not an Islamic 
government. All of those without jobs (100 percent, N=22) 
said that they would not return if there was not an Islamic 
government. The one person who said he would return if 
there was not an Islamic government had a job. This would 
not support the hypothesis, but is so limited it is 
insignificant. 
Those without jobs were more willing to return if the 
Shah returned to power than those with jobs. Of those with 
no job in Pakistan 40.9 percent (N=nine) said they would not 
return if the Shah returned to power, compared to 57.4 
percent (N=35) of those with jobs. This would support the 
hypothesis. 
When asked if they would return if there were no jobs 
in Afghanistan the only person who said, "No," did not have 
a job in Pakistan. Ninety-six percent (N=96) said they 
would return, and three people with jobs said, "Maybe" they 
would return. This would not support the hypothesis. 
Whether or not people had jobs in Pakistan did not seem 
to affect their willingness to return if there were no 
schools, only two people said they would not return if there 
were no schools and they did have jobs; and 18 percent 
(N=18) said if there was an Islamic government there would 
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be schools. This was fairly evenly distributed among those 
with and without jobs. All the other respondents said they 
would return if there were no schools. This would not 
support the hypothesis. 
Whether or not one had a job in Pakistan only slightly 
effected willingness to return under a coalition government. 
Eighty-two percent (N=18) of those without jobs said they 
would not return under a coalition government. This 
compared to 89.8 percent (N=62) of those with jobs saying 
they would not return. While there is a slight difference, 
it is accounted for by only two cases, so is not 
significant. This would not support or disprove the 
hypothesis. 
The hypothesis that the greater the degree of economic 
assimilation, the less the likelihood of repatriation, would 
be supported for the issues of whether the parties were 
fighting, mines were present, or the Shah returned to run 
the government which would support Bogue's (1969) 
identification of this as an important "pull." This 
hypothesis would not be supported for the issues of 
returning if there are no jobs or no schools, and it is not 
supported for the issues of the withdrawal of the Soviets 
and a non Islamic government or a coalition government. It 
should be noted that these non supporting matters have a 
high degree of unanimity among the respondents and probably 
were ideological responses. Therefore these responses might 
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not be significant in not supporting this hypothesis. 
Next we will consider the hypothesis that the less the 
socio-cultural similarity with the host society the greater 
the likelihood of repatriation. There were respondents from 
six categories of ethnic groups. However, only two had more 
than one respondent in a particular ethnic group, these two 
being the two largest groups in Afghanistan and the majority 
of those in refuge in Pakistan. The two groups were the 
Pushtuns and the Tajiks. The Pushtun category had 83 
respondents while the Tajik had 13. Both the Pushtuns and 
the Tajiks fled to and settled in Pushtun areas. These two 
groups will be compared to determine willingness to return 
from a similar ethnic group area and a non-similar ethnic 
group area. 
The only person who was willing to return under the 
Soviets was a Pushtun. While 22.9 percent (N=19) of the 
Pushtuns were willing to return if the parties were fighting 
for power, none of the Tajiks were. This would not support 
the hypothesis. 
If mines were still present, 61.4 percent (N=51) of the 
Pushtuns said they would not return. However 84.6 percent 
(N=ll) of the Tajiks said they would not return. This would 
not support the hypothesis. 
The one respondent who said he would return under a 
non-Islamic government was Pushtun, while all Tajiks said 
they would not return under these conditions. Like the 
issue of the Soviets, this is too limited to draw any 
conclusions. 
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The Pushtuns and the Tajiks were both about equally 
opposed to the Shah. Whereas 45.8 percent (N=38) of the 
Pushtuns said they would not return under the Shah, 46.2 
percent (N=6) of the Tajiks said they would not return. 
When asked if they would return if there were no jobs, the 
only person who said, "Yes," was a Tajik, three Pushtuns 
said, "Maybe," and everyone else said, "Yes they would 
return if there were no jobs." 
When asked if they would return if there were no 
schools the only people who answered, "No," were two 
Pushtuns. Fifteen Pushtuns also said that if there were an 
Islamic government there would be schools, as did three 
Tajiks. 
When asked if they were willing to return under a 
coalition government, 79.5 percent (N=66) of the Pushtuns 
said, "No," 84.6 percent (N=ll) of the Tajiks said, "No," 
one said, "Maybe," one said he would accept it if others 
did. 
This hypothesis would be not be supported. Except for 
returning if there were no schools or under the Shah, the 
Pushtuns are more willing to return than the Tajiks. It is 
possible that what is really being measured here is 
respondents' geographic proximity to the area they are from 
or that since Afghanistan has been traditionally dominated 
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by the Pushtuns politically they are more willing to return 
to a country in which they are dominant. 
The hypothesis covering the personal perception 
variable of economic opportunity says that someone who has 
greater economic opportunity at home but no work in Pakistan 
would be more willing to repatriate. However, only one 
respondent said that he not would return if there were no 
jobs. This person did not have a job in Pakistan and was a 
farmer in Afghanistan. The other 21 respondents who did not 
have jobs in Pakistan said they would return if there were 
not jobs in Afghanistan. Of those with jobs all but three 
said they would return if there were no jobs; three people 
with jobs said, "Maybe," they would return if there were no 
jobs. This is an area that certainly needs more research 
but at this point one would have to say that this hypothesis 
is not supported. As had been noted earlier, even though 
the refugees may honestly plan on returning, due to the 
extensive devastation (based on UNHCR workers' surveys in 
Afghanistan) there is a possibility that there may be 
return refugees after the initial repatriation, as observed 
by Jeff Crisp (September 1987) in his study of Laotian 
refugees. 
Considering the personal perception variable of being a 
minority in Afghanistan, this was an area that Kunz had 
identified as being an "events alienated" refugee, which is 
when due to past discrimination a refugee is embittered 
towards their former compatriots (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43). 
The hypothesis to be tested states,"The greater the 
socio-cultural similarity with the home population the 
greater the likelihood of repatriation." 
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The same data used to test cultural compatibility with 
the Pakistanis will be used to test this hypothesis. 
The only category that had more than one respondent was 
the Tajiks who, while being a large group, are a minority 
compared to the Pushtuns in size and power. 
The one person who was willing to return under the 
Russians was a Pushtun. 
If the parties were fighting for power 22.9 percent 
(N=19) of the Pushtuns were willing to return but none of 
the Tajiks were. 
If the mines still existed, 61.4 percent (N=51) of the 
Pushtuns said they would not return, and 84.6 percent (N=ll) 
of the Tajiks said they would not return. 
The one person who was willing to return if there was 
not an Islamic government was a Pushtun. 
If the Shah returned Pushtuns and Tajiks were fairly 
equal in the percent who said they would not return. 
Tajiks had the one person who said he would not return 
if there were no jobs. 
The one real break in the pattern is if there are no 
schools, the two people who said they would not return, were 
Pushtuns. 
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If there was a coalition government, eleven percent of 
the Pushtuns said, "Yes, they would return," but no Tajiks 
said, "Yes." 
In comparing Pushtun and Tajik, the hypothesis stating, 
"The greater the socio-cultural similarity with the home 
population the less the likelihood of repatriation," is 
supported by the data. This would support the 
identification by Kunz of the importance of self-
identif ication by the refugee (1981, pp. 42-43). 
While no specific author has identified education as a 
variable that impacts refugee.migrations, there are such 
general issues raised by authors such as Everett s. Lee 
(1966, pg. 56) in which he stated, "Migration is selective," 
and "positive selection is made for migrants of high 
quality." 
Education was chosen as one such indication of "high 
quality" When the education of the respondents was cross 
tabbed with a willingness to return if the parties were 
fighting for power, it was found that 68.4 percent (N=26) of 
those with no education were not willing to return under 
these conditions, compared to 100 percent (N=three) of those 
with three-five years, 75 percent (N=six) of those with six-
eight years education, 53.1 percent of those with nine-12 
years and only 42.1 percent of those with 13-15 years or 
more. The most willing to return if the parties were 
fighting are those with the most education. When 
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considering the question of mines, 78.9 percent (N=30) of 
those without education said they would not return before 
the removal of the mines, compared to 66.7 percent (N=two) 
of those with three-five years of education, 75 percent 
(N=six)of those with six-eight years, 59.4 percent (N=19) of 
those with nine-12 years, and 42.1 percent (N=eight) of 
those with 13-15 years and more. Again the most willing to 
return are those with the most education. A rough 
relationship appears to be that as education increases so 
does willingness to return. It is possible that as the 
level of education-~ncreases the respondents either see more 
opportunities for themselves or see more possible outcomes 
to a situation. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
When drawing conclusions from the interview data, one 
generality that can be drawn is that the Afghans as a group 
either tend to have almost complete unanimity on an issue or 
they have very diverse beliefs. 
The hypothesis that states, "The obstacles to 
repatriation will vary in relation to the original reasons 
for flight," would be supported. This would support the 
concepts behind Bogue's (1969) and Lee's (1966) work, of 
migration being the sum of "pluses" and "minuses" or "pulls" 
and "pushes." Just as continuation of the original factors 
causing flight, the issues that arise in the intervening 
years of refuge can also block repatriation. For the 
Afghans this includes the parties fighting for power, the 
Shah returning, and the mines. All of these can act as 
minuses or pushes to keep the Afghans from desiring to 
repatriate. Simultaneously, the Afghans have established 
communities, social and cultural ties and been economically 
assimilated in Pakistan. All of these acts as pulls or 
pluses to remain in Pakistan. This is an area that is 
considerably underrated by the various governments and 
agencies involved. While it is undeniably crucial to remove 
or reduce the original causes of flight, the factors that 
have arisen since can be just as important in blocking 
repatriation. 
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The second hypothesis states, "The relationship between 
age and probability of repatriation is curvilinear." This 
hypothesis would not be supported. There are a few general 
relationships evident, but they are not curvilinear. For 
the relationship between the parties fighting and age there 
is a rough relationship indicating that as people got older 
they were more and more willing to return if the parties 
were fighting for power. As far as the issue of the mines 
goes the least willing to return if there still are mines 
are the oldest. These simple relationships I believe would 
support the identification by Lee (1966) of age as being an 
important factor. As far as willingness to accept a non-
Islamic government, one general conclusion that can be drawn 
is that the most willing to accept non-Islamic government 
are the youngest, those between 15-24. In regard to 
acceptance of the Shah, there is no clear relationship 
between age and willingness to accept his return. There 
also does not appear to be any relationship between age and 
willingness to return if there are no schools or no jobs. 
The third hypothesis states that, "The concerns about 
safety will vary with number of dependents." This 
hypothesis considered marital status, number of children, 
and age of youngest child. Safety in the context of flight 
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and repatriation would be a minus or push blocking return if 
an area was not safe. If the parties were still fighting, 
those most opposed to returning were those who were single, 
next were those who were married and finally those who were 
widowed. This would not support this hypothesis. Those who 
were least willing to repatriate if the mines were not 
removed were the widowers followed by those who were 
married, and the most willing to return were those who were 
single. several things to be considered here, are that on 
the one hand, the number of widowers is small (four total), 
so they might not be reliable; on the other hand, they might 
have concerns about other dependents which would make them 
not want to return. Comparing just single and married, this 
hypothesis would be supported. For the issue of marital 
status, this hypothesis is supported under one condition but 
not another. This is an area that would certainly benefit 
from further research. 
The issue of safety and number of children does not 
show any clear relationship for number of children and 
concern about returning under the Russians, while the 
parties are fighting or if there are still mines present. 
For this measure the hypothesis would not be supported. 
When looking at the age of the youngest dependent and 
willingness to return if there is fighting among the 
parties, there is increasing willingness to return as the 
age of the youngest child increases. There is also a rough 
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increase in willingness to return if there are mines as the 
age of the youngest child increases. This would support the 
hypothesis that concerns about safety will vary with number 
of dependents, which would support the identification by 
Bogue (1969, pg. 754) 9f the importance of dependents. 
The next hypothesis had to do with the effect of time 
on willingness to repatriate. This hypothesis states, "The 
greater the time that a refugee has been out of the home 
country the less likelihood of repatriation." For the issue 
of returning under the Russians no conclusion can be drawn. 
When returning if the parties are fighting for power, no 
relationship appears to exist, the same can be said about 
returning if there are mines or a non-Islamic government. 
It is not possible to tell if time in refuge has any affect 
on willingness to return if there are no jobs or no schools 
since all but a few people said they would return. These 
findings would not support this hypothesis. When 
considering the willingness to accept the Shah there is a 
strong relationship. The answers of the respondents 
indicate that the longer they were in refuge the more 
willing they are to accept the Shah. When considering a 
coalition government there was a rough trend for people to 
be more willing to return under a coalition government the 
longer they had been out of Afghanistan. These 
relationships would not support the hypothesis. I believe 
in fact that they indicate some other relationship. 
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Tied to the issue of time is the hypothesis that states 
that, "Over time, the general population will become more 
concerned about pragmatic issues, while the ideological 
leaders will shift towards more ideological concerns." 
There does not appear to be any relationship if the parties 
are fighting, if there are mines or there is not an Islamic 
government. This would not support the hypothesis. If the 
Shah returns, people are more willing to return the longer 
they have been out of the country, which supports the 
hypothesis for the general population. Respondents' 
willingness to return under a coalition government roughly 
increased, which supports this hypothesis. The few limited 
respondents who voiced concern about jobs had all been in 
refuge 5-10 years;, the two people who expressed concern 
about schools had fled 3-6 years before. While not enough 
data were collected about leaders to draw any conclusions, 
based on observations and conversations, leaders were more 
concerned with ideological issues than were the everyday 
people. While these findings are very tentative, they 
indicate that with further research these relationships 
would support this hypothesis. 
The next hypothesis has to do with the greater the 
geographic distance the less the likelihood of repatriation. 
The one person willing to return if the Russians were still 
present was from Kabul (a province close to the border). If 
the parties were fighting, those from provinces far from the 
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border were less willing to return. They were also less 
willing to return if there were mines present, if there was 
a non-Islamic government, if there were not schools and if 
there was a coalition government. Thus the data would 
support this hypothesis. There was no relationship in 
regard to where someone was from and willingness to return 
under the Shah or if there were no jobs. For this 
hypothesis, there was such a small number of respondents 
from provinces not close to the border that it is not 
possifle to draw a reliable conclusion. However it 
indicates that there is a possibility that there is a 
relationship which warrants further research. I believe 
that in general this does support Lee's (1966) 
identification of the importance of intervening variables. 
Hypothesis number seven says, "The greater the degree 
of economic assimilation the less the likelihood of 
repatriation." There did appear to be slight relationship 
between having a job in Pakistan and the willingness to 
return if the parties were fighting, there were mines, or 
the Shah returned. This would support this hypothesis. The 
one person who said he would return under the Russians had 
no job in Pakistan, and the two people who said they would 
not return if there was no school had jobs in Pakistan. 
These findings are so limited they cannot be relied on to 
draw a general conclusion. This hypothesis is supported in 
some areas but not others. This is an important finding 
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since so much emphasis has been placed on the Afghans being 
economic refugees. A very common theme in Pakistan is that 
the Afghans are there merely for jobs, this finding would 
certainly dispute that the Afghans are in Pakistan only for 
jobs. 
The next hypothesis states, "The less the degree of 
socio-cultural similarity with a host society the greater 
the chance of repatriation." To test this Tajiks and 
Pushtuns were compared, both being in refuge in a Pushtun 
area of Pakistan. The one person willing to return under 
the Soviets was a Pushtun, the Pusht4ns were more willing to 
return if there was fighting between the parties, there were 
mines, there was a non-Islamic government, or a coalition 
government. The two people who said they would not return 
if there were no schools were Pushtun. There was no 
relationship in regards to returning under the Shah, or if 
there were no jobs. Overall this hypothesis would not be 
supported by the data. 
The next set of hypotheses have to do with personal 
perceptions about Afghanistan. The first personal 
perception variable states that the greater the socio-
cultural similarity with the home population the greater the 
likelihood of repatriation. Again using the Pushtuns and 
the Tajiks as a test of this, the Pushtuns are more willing 
to return if the parties are fighting, there are mines, 
there are no jobs and there is a coalition government, there 
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is a limited relationship for the Pushtuns returning under 
the Russians and under a non-Islamic government. There was 
no relationship in regards to the Shah, or returning if 
there is no schools. This hypothesis would be supported. 
This would support Kunz's (1981) identification of the 
importance of the refugees' identification with his or her 
compatriots. 
The second personal perception hypothesis states that, 
"The greater the economic opportunities at home, the greater 
the likelihood of repatriation." The overwhelming 
insistence of all but four respondents that they would 
return home if there were no jobs in Afghanistan, would not 
support this hypothesis. 
The final hypothesis has to do with personal safety and 
states that, "The less the fear about safety the greater the 
chance for repatriation." Based on the finding that the 
majority of the people would not return if the Russians were 
still present, the parties were fighting for power, or there 
were mines present, this hypothesis would be supported as 
well. This would support both Bogue's (1969) and Kunz's 
(1981) identification of war or threat to safety as an 
important factor in causing flight. 
When education was used as an independent variable, 
increased levels of education were roughly associated with 
an increasing willingness to return if the parties were 
fighting for power or the mines had not been removed. 
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If one were to construct a composite of a person that 
would be least likely to return based on the data collected 
during this thesis, it would be someone who still had the 
reasons that drove him out of Afghanistan in the first 
place, either very young or very old, married, have infant 
children, have fled Afghanistan fairly recently, be part of 
the general population (not a leader), be from a non border 
province, not be economically assimilated in Pakistan, be a 
minority (not a Pushtun), not have the personal safety 
issues resolved and, have some (three to five years) 
education. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE AFGHAN REFUGEES 
1. The Afghan refugees are made up of political and 
human rights refugees, who have become economic refugees in 
the interim. 
2. There probably will be two flows or vintages 
returning. Those who are political and human rights refugees, 
and those who have become economic refugees. 
3. Economic refugees will be much slower in returning. 
In the recent case of Haitian refugees, the political refugees 
returned immediately while most of the economic refugees 
waited to see what would happen next. 
4. If economic problems are not dealt with, economic 
refugees may return to their host country, as in the case of 
Laotian refugees who fled into Thailand for economic reasons. 
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Forcible repatriation will cause many to flee right back. The 
Afghans have expressed their belief that since the U.S. and 
others helped extensively during the war they will provide 
extensive aid to rebuild once people return. 
5. If civil war breaks out in Afghanistan, there is 
every reason to believe that refugees will not return or that 
returnees will turn around and leave again in new flows. Many 
refugee flows in Africa are the direct result of civil war. 
Uganda is an excellent example of this. civil wars have 
caused severe refugee problems in Burma, Laos, Lebanon, and 
Nicaragua as well. 
6. If extensive aid continues, as has been suggested, 
for the Afghans living in Pakistan, and if the Afghans are not 
forcibly dragged to the border by the Pakistanis, and if civil 
war breaks out and the Afghans are told not to return by rebel 
leaders, few, if any appreciable number, will return. 
7. Repatriation can be forced through lack of aid. Such 
was the case for Ugandans forced out of the Sudan and back 
into Uganda; many returned even though fearing they might be 
killed. Refugees can be forcibly returned as the Laotians 
were forced from Thailand. Both of these refugee situations 
saw many fleeing their home country again. This scenario has 
been mentioned by Pakistan, other countries, and NGO's for 
forcing repatriation. 
8. One important issue for the Afghans is, naturally, 
their cultural heritage. The Afghans are extremely proud of 
165 
their heritage and desire very strongly to return to their 
homeland. At the same time, many of these people have been 
nomadic or semi-nomadic and have crossed the Pakistani/Afghan 
border numerous times in the past and will continue to do so 
in the future. So while returning may be very important, it 
may not necessarily have to take place right away. 
9. A very important consideration is that, despite 
emphasis on what individuals will do and how they will decide 
to return, the leaders will have a big impact on the decision 
to return. Of the respondents, 48 percent have said the 
leader of the tribe will decide when they will return home. 
10. Another very important aspect of the Afghans' return 
is that they have no set timetable for when they would return. 
Only four respondents actually gave a time of possible return; 
all others said something like, "When the Russians leave, and 
the mines are gone and there is an Islamic government." 
11. Many of the Afghans have been refugees now for ten 
years or longer. Because of the time involved, a high 
proportion have been assimilated into the Pakistan and Iranian 
economy and therefore will not return. 
12. To have repatriation occur, three different events 
will have to take place. First, there will have to be a 
political change in Afghanistan, such as the establishment of 
an Islamic government. Secondly, civil wars must end and 
safety issues such as the removal of mines must be dealt with 
(based on data from 1988). And finally, economic aid must be 
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available to returnees for support and rebuilding. 
13. Even though it is a very simple finding, I believe 
that the percent of respondents who say they will not return 
under certain conditions is a reliable indicator of what the 
population of refugees at large may feel. According to the 
respondents, 99 percent said they would not return before the 
withdrawal of the Russians. According to UNHCR workers and 
NGO workers I spoke to in 1988, less than one percent of the 
refugees had returned before the Soviet withdrawal. The next 
most important issue was whether refugees would return if 
there was not an Islamic government, 95 percent said, "No" 
they would not. According to conversations with UNHCR workers 
and NGO workers, who had returned from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan in 1991, it was estimated that five percent or 
less of the refugees had repatriated so far. There are five 
other issues about which varying amounts of people say they 
will not return under certain circumstances. Rated from most 
important to least important: 80 percent said they would not 
return if there was a coalition government; 65 percent said 
they would not return if the mines had not been removed; sixty 
percent indicated they would not return if the parties were 
fighting for power; if the Shah returns 44 percent said they 
will not return; if there are no schools two percent said they 
will not return; if there are no jobs one percent said they 
will not return. Because the number of respondents who said 
they would not return before the withdrawal of the Russians 
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and if there was not an Islamic government has closely matched 
what has happened in the interim, I believe it indicates that 
these other issues which are minuses or pushes blocking 
repatriation may have a similar importance for the general 
population of Afghan refugees. 
PREDICTING RETURN 
There are several different ways in which the process of 
who will repatriate can be predicted. One such way is to use 
a Bogue type scheme and measure the "pushes" and "pulls" and 
from their sum predict under what conditions people will 
return (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). 
To make predictions of possible outcomes of possible 
repatriation, one needs to weigh the pushes or minuses against 
the pluses or pulls to repatriate. As has been stated 
previously, pulls or pushes can come from home country as well 
as host country. Currently in Pakistan, the refugees enjoy 
political refuge, they are physically safe, they receive aid 
from international agencies, the majority are ethnically 
similar to their hosts, both hosts and refugees are Moslem 
(which is important to the Afghans), and some refugees are 
able to find employment in the local economy. Overall in 
Pakistan, all factors operating are positive pulls to keep the 
refugees from returning home. The economic situation in 
Pakistan is best described as neutral; some refugees find 
work, others do not. Obviously at this point in time the 
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pulls or pluses in Pakistan combined with the minuses or 
pushes in Afghanistan are enough to keep 95 percent of the 
refugees from returning. currently this system is almost at 
a standstill. One option would be to turn the pluses or 
positive factors in Pakistan into negative ones: humanitarian 
aid could be cut off, all refugee work could be stopped, and 
the refugees could be forcibly rounded up at gunpoint and 
driven to the border and forced across. Forced return, or 
refoulment, has been denounced by the UNHCR as both being in 
violation of a refugees' rights as well as being a non-viable 
alternative since it is usually not a durable solution, but 
one that results in subsequent refugee flight. Recognizing 
this, one can rate the importance of the factors holding the 
Afghans in Pakistan, but for solutions one must change the 
factors acting as pushes or minuses in Afghanistan which block 
return. 
Based on responses given by the refugees interviewed, one 
can estimate percentages of returnees. The ranges listed are 
derived from the factor which will cause the highest rates of 
non-return and the next highest factor below it, then each 
successive factor below that. The situation that currently 
exists is a negative scenario where between 80 percent and 65 
percent will not return. The high rate of non-return will 
occur if a coalition government or what is perceived as a 
coalition government is formed, the mines are not removed, and 
other negative factors remain in place. If there is not a 
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coalition government, but the mines are in place and the 
parties are fighting between 65 percent and 60 percent will 
not return. If the mines have been removed, but the parties 
are fighting and the Shah returns, between 60 percent and 44 
percent will not return. If the parties are not fighting but 
the Shah returns and there are no schools, between 44 percent 
and two percent will not return. If the Shah does not return, 
but there are no schools and no jobs between two and one 
percent will not return. Even if all negative factors which 
currently block return are removed, due to the large amount of 
time passing while the Afghans have been in refuge and the 
accompanying economic and cultural assimilation, it is very 
possible that between ten and 15 percent will never 
repatriate. 
While in Peshawar I met with Llyod Deacon, a UNHCR 
officer. Based on his knowledge of the situation he said the 
refugees would return in three stages. First would be the 
farmers living in the refugee camps. They would go to areas 
controlled by the Mujahideen and that had been cleared of 
mines. Secondly, the small time merchants and city dwellers 
who had been living in the city would go. Last to go will be 
the big merchants or successful businessmen who have a lot of 
cash. The last group may wait as long as two or three years 
until they are guaranteed security. Deacon also said that 
current programs in Afghanistan (in 1988) were geared towards 
getting farmers to return first; once the farmers are in place 
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hopefully it would draw other refugees back (based on field 
notes of conversation with Llyod Deacon, November 1988). 
Writers such as William Wood, believe that return will be 
based, first, on the determination of the tribal leaders and 
Mujahideen leaders of when it is safe to go back. Secondly, 
the border provinces will receive the first returnees, who 
will be men who return several months or weeks before their 
families, to repair homes and fields. This will then be 
followed thirdly by a slower, more organizeq migration (Wood 
1989). 
Finally it should be noted that I have just received a 
letter, dated May 4, 1992, (following the collapse of the 
communist regime in Kabul) from one of the Afghans who worked 
as my assistant and he says, "My family will leave as soon as 
the peace gets stability in the country, however those who 
used to live in the cities have already started moving, 
because their houses are intact" (personal letter from Afghan 
refugee) . 
THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES 
Based on the work of the authors cited in this thesis, to 
summarize the Afghan refugee situation one would best start 
with the work of Bogue or Lee. The Afghans were pushed out 
of their country by "minuses" (Lee 1966, pg. 50) or "pushes" 
(Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). The Afghans are a "Reactive Fate 
Group" in that they are refugees of war or revolutionary 
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changes (Kunz 1981, pg. 44). The Afghan refugees would also 
be considered "The Majority Identified" in that they believe 
that their opposition to the situation is shared by the 
majority of their compatriots (Kunz 1981, pp. 42-43). The 
Afghans were pushed out by "home related factors" (Lee 1966, 
pg. 50, Kunz 1981, pp. 42-46). Other than the war, the 
other home related factors include: the political situation 
in the home country (Akel 1987, pg. 156) and ethnic and 
religious conflict (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). In the 
interim the Afghans have become economic refugees as well. 
The Afghans overcame the "intervening obstacle" of geography 
(Lee 1966, pg. 50). The Afghans have been "pulled" to the 
host country of Pakistan by host related factors (Lee 1966, 
pg. 50, Kunz 1981, pp. 46-49). The "pulls" include 
"preferable environment and living conditions and dependency 
of persons to whom one is related" (Bogue 1969, pg. 754). 
If one considers Kunz's "host related factors," the Afghans 
and Pakistanis share the same language (in the Northwest 
Frontier Province), they both have similar values, both 
Afghans and Pakistanis have similar traditions, share the 
same religion (Islam), the Pakistanis have an Islamic 
government, the Afghans want one, they eat similar types of 
food and have similar interpersonal relations (Kunz 1981, 
pg. 47). In fact Pakistan as a host country is culturally 
compatible (generally) in all the areas that Kunz 
identified. 
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MODEL OF FLOW 
The best general description that can be made about the 
Afghan flight and possible repatriation, and all refugee 
flights, is that it is a process or cycle encompassing two 
countries and the interplay of factors or "pushes" and "pulls" 
between them (Bogue 1969, pp. 753-754). 
A good analogy to use here is that the process is similar 
to the cycle a motor goes through. Refugees are pushed out of 
their country and pulled to a host country. The Afghans were 
pushed out initially or in the interim by all four spheres: 
political, human rights, economic and socio-cultural. They 
have overcome the geographic obstacles and were pulled to 
Pakistan by the socio-cultural sphere, the human rights sphere 
and the political sphere. The economic sphere would be 
considered neutral. Since their arrival, time has become an 
intervening obstacle. To repatriate, the pulls home must 
overcome the pulls to remain in a host country (Bogue 1969), 
in this case Pakistan. While the political situation or 
sphere has improved in Afghanistan it is still far from ideal. 
The same can be said about the socio-cultural and human rights 
sphere. Finally, the economic sphere continues to be very 
negative or to push refugees away. Like a gasoline engine 
this process or cycle can run very badly or inefficiently, 
with pulls barely overcoming pushes, or it can run very 
efficiently with pulls for movement very strong and the pushes 
blocking movement, non-existent or weak. A system running 
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with high efficiency (lots of pluses and low or no minuses) 
would have high levels of returnees. A system running with 
low efficiency (lots of minuses and few pluses) would have low 
or no rates of returnees. To apply the analogy to the 
Afghans, one would have to say that at this point, the motor 
(or cycle) is running at low efficiency, because the pushes 
blocking return and the pulls from the host country are still 
stronger than the pulls to return home, to Afghanistan. 
(See Figure 5., Refugee Flight and Repatriation Flow Model.) 
FURTHER RESEARCH THAT IS NEEDED 
In general all of the topics covered in this research 
project would benefit from further research covering a 
greater sample. Over time a number of the issues and 
scenarios described within the work will come to pass, so 
continued longitudinal research would be beneficial as well 
to see if the amounts of returnees match the responses of 
the sample. 
Specific areas that seemed to be important, but had few 
respondents, or not enough data collected about them and 
hence have questionable reliability, were the issues of why 
people left, ethnic differences, gender differences, 
differences in those from different geographic locations, 
and effect of dependents on willingness to repatriate. All 
of these areas would benefit from a larger sample and more 
in-depth research. 
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One area that would have been beneficial to pursue 
would have been to study the group decision making processes 
and how they differ among various tribal groups and other 
forms of leadership, both among the Afghans as well as 
refugees around the world. 
Another area that would have been fascinating to pursue 
would have been a longitudinal study of what specific 
respondents said they would do and what they in fact later 
did do. This would allow a correlation between intention 
and actual behavior to be measured .. 
Most i~portant of all would be to conduct more research 
on other refugee populations to determine what is unique and 
specific to the Afghans and what are universal factors and 
issues affecting all refugees. 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire used in interviewing Afghan refugee subjects; 
1. Age 
2. Ethnic Group /Tribe 
3. Marital status 
4. Number of Children and ages 
5. Home town and village or province 
6. How many years of education have you had? 
7. What are your reasons for leaving Afghanistan? 
8. When did you leave Afghanistan? 
9. Do you live in a refugee camp? if not where? 
10. Do you work here in Pakistan? 
11. What was your job in Afghanistan? 
12. Is your family here with you? 
13. Will you return to Afghanistan before the Soviet 
withdrawal? 
14. Will you return if the Mujahideen and the parties are 
fighting for power? 
15. Will you return before the removal of the mines. 
16. Will you return if there is not an Islamic government. 
17. Which party do you belong to? 
18. Which party should run the government? 
19. Would you return if King Zahir Shah ran the government? 
20. Will you return if there are no jobs in Afghanistan? 
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21. Will you return if there are no schools? 
22. How important is religious freedom for you to return? 
23. How will you return to Afghanistan? 
24. Do you think the rich Afghan will return to Afghanistan? 
25. Do you think the student in the university will stay here 
to finish their studies? 
26. Do you know anyone who will stay here? 
27. If someone stayed in Pakistan what would their family do. 
28. When the refugees go back what will they need to survive? 
29. How have the Pakistanis helped the refugees? 
29a What help have other countries given. 
30. Will the Pakistanis continue to help when the refugees 
return home? 
31. With all of the Afghans heavily armed will there be a 
problem with violence when everyone goes home. 
32. When will you and the other refugees return? 
33. Would you return if there was a coalition government with 
the communists? 
34. What will people do about roof poles and building 
material when they return home? 
35. Are there any other important issues I have not asked 
about ? 
36. What will you take back with you? 
37. What will your tribe do will they all go back together? 
38. Who will decide when it is time for your tribe to go 
back? 
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39. What job will you do when you return? 
40. Will Pakistan ever force the refugees to leave? 
41. Does your family feel the same way about these issues? 
